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THE INTERNAL-EXTERNAL DICHOTOMY:
A Theoretical Approach to Foreign Policy Decision-making
ABSTRACT
In this study the author formulates and applys a
decision-making model which attempts to uncover the role
of justification in the policy process. When discussing
the importance of justification in the policy process the
author distinguishes between the "internal" and "exte
rnal" realms. The internal realm is a theoretical
category which describes social interactions within the
highest levels of government (discussions within the
N.S.C. and the cabinet). The external realm describes
politics outside the inner circle; this involves the
press, the public and an attentive international
audience. The concerns of policy makers, and their
explanations of policy, change depending on the realm in
which they are justifying a given policy.
Chapter One outlines the theoretical framework of
the model and reveiws some of the relevant literature in
the field. Chapter Two focusses on the causes of diver
gence between internal and external justifications and
employs the decision to implement the Truman Doctrine in
1947 as a case study. Chapter Three offers a more subtle
application of the model and discusses qualitative types
of divergence— the decision to commit combat troops in
Vietnam serves as the second case study.
All the examples offered in the paper deal with
American foreign policy decisions; however, the model is
not limited to this avenue of analysis. As the author
shows, this approach has far-reaching implications for
international relations, definitions of political power
and decision-making theory.
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INTRODUCTION

When political leaders, advisors, and bureaucrats
formulate a policy, they inevitably justify it or offer
reasons why the state ought to pursue that policy rather
than another.

This process of justification takes place

in at least two spheres of activity: the "internal” realm
and the "external" realm.

During the policy making

process, reasons supporting a particular course of action
are typically discussed and debated among upper level
decision-makers behind closed doors.

The reasons offered

in such a forum to support a ratified action will be
considered the "internal justification."

The executive

may justify and explain the policy to those beyond the
inner circle of decision-makers using the same or dis
similar arguments as those expressed in the internal
justification.

In any case, the justification offered to

the public, press and the international community will be
called the "external justification."

This frequently

overlooked distinction becomes important when the politi
cal leader, analyst, or researcher tries to understand,
predict, or explain- the actions of a state in interna
tional relations.
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Often the executive will find it politically ex
pedient to cultivate a divergence between the internal
and external justifications for a policy.

It is clear

that for purposes of presentation, a government may find
its interests best served when the external justification
is different from the internal one.

For example, country

A may decide to bomb country B for the purpose of killing
the leader of B.

A may then find it beneficial to jus

tify the policy to the press, the public, and the inter
national community as retaliation for past attacks on the
citizens and property of country A and for the purpose of
deterring future attacks by B on A.

Whether country B

actually attacked A's citizens and property will affect
the acceptability of the external justification; however,
it does not alter the rationale for diverging from the
internal justification.

Policy-makers are aware that the

internal justification may appear less acceptable to the
domestic population or the international community than
the external justification.
While there are a number of possible reasons for a
government to maintain different internal and external
justifications for a policy, this study will emphasize
the perceived need of states to perpetuate a divergence
because of an attentive international audience.

States
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pursue their interests within an increasingly interdepen
dent world where the actions of one state often affect
the interests of another.

For this reason allies and

adversaries of any given state will be attuned to the
actions and words of that state.

Naturally, the most

important and powerful nations have the greatest influ
ence on a large number of other states.

Therefore, the

most powerful will be the most closely watched and thus
have the greatest incentive to cultivate a certain im
age,1 whether as steadfast ally, cooperative internation
al trade partner, resolute adversary, or even irrational
madman.2

Robert Jervis discusses the importance of percep
tions in International Relations as they affect the
ability of states to successfully pursue their objectives
claiming, "Throughout history and especially for the
great powers since 1945, states have often cared about
specific issues less for their intrinsic value than for
the conclusions they felt others would draw from the way
they dealt with them." Robert Jervis, The Logic of
Images in International Relations (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1970), 7.
2While the United States has rarely played the part
of irrational madman, the Eisenhower administration's
espoused military doctrine which relied heavily on asym
metrical responses to Soviet provocation could be viewed
as such. An American nuclear strike in response to a
limited conventional attack might be seen as irrational
in the sense that the potential benefits of such a strike
would be less than the likely costs.
(i.e. war, or later
even nuclear retaliation by the Soviet Union.)
However,
by giving the appearance of irrationality, it was hoped
Moscow would be less willing to embark on military adven
tures that threatened the interests of the West. Ob
viously, the presentation of oneself as irrational madman

5
This paper deals almost entirely with U.S. foreign
policy decisions.

The raw data on "internal justifica

tions" was more fully documented and readily available in
U.S. government documents and memoirs than in those of
any other country, making the material well suited for
this study.

The topic is best covered not by using one

or two full length case studies but a number of shorter
ones from a variety of different administrations and
issue areas.

This method is preferred because it helps

demonstrate the regularity of divergence conditioned by
the international system and the structure of governmen
tal institutions in the United States rather than the
personal outlook or deceitful character of a few individ
uals .3
By describing various foreign policy decisions in
terms of the internal-external dichotomy one can hope to
accomplish three things.

First, and most obviously, one

is offered a new perspective on the actual process of

may be completely rational. For a discussion of asym
metry and "brinksmanship" see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1982), 150-151.
3The study concentrates on what Waltz terms "second
and third levels of analysis," of explanations of events
focussing on the nature of the state and the internation
al system respectively.
See Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the
State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959), esp. chpts 1-3.
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decision-making.

By approaching foreign policy decision

making in this way, one is forced to ask more probing
questions about the forces and interests that drive this
dynamic process.

Second, the study has broader implica

tions for international relations.

A misunderstanding of

power defined strictly in terms of military, economic,
demographic and geographic assets has led many observers
to inaccurate and inadequate explanations of events in
international relations.

This examination casts doubt on

narrow definitions of power and shows that the perceived
need of states to project a particular image in the world
affects the decision-making process to a greater degree
than is usually assumed.

Third, in the process of study

ing various cases the very theoretical framework being
applied is tested, revised and polished.

The author's

most lofty hopes would be realized if this paper clari
fied or extended useful theoretical approaches to inter
national politics (or decision-making processes) so other
research projects might benefit from such work in the
future.
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CHAPTER I: JUSTIFICATION IN THE POLICY PROCESS
The Internal/External Dichotomy
A justification is a reason or set of reasons of
fered to an audience to show there are adequate grounds
to support and pursue some action.

A justification may

or may not represent the actual cause of some action or
policy.

It merely has to offer a well-warranted reason

for the action.

For example, country A could do X for

reason Y and then justify X for reason Z.

The purpose of

a justification is to make some action acceptable to a
given audience.

Naturally, as one's audience changes,

the justification for the same action may have to change
to ensure the action remains acceptable.
When the executive branch of the U.S. government
adopts a particular policy, it usually presents the
policy to the public and explains the policy's purpose.
It is in this realm of press conferences and public
speeches that we find the "external justification," which
many observers have otherwise called "the official line."
Sometimes there is no immediate justification accompany
ing the initiation of the policy— for example, when the
action is covert— but in these cases an external jus
tification usually emerges after the fact.

The

"internal justification" is a reason or set of reasons
offered within the executive branch behind closed doors—
most often in the National Security Council (N.S.C.),
National Security Planning Group (N.S.P.G.) or some
similar forum.

The internal justification is usually a

more causally efficacious reason in explaining a policy
than the external justification; however, as we will
discuss in detail later, it would be a mistake to con
sider the internal justification the a priori "real
reason" for the adoption of some policy.1
Paul Anderson claims "the constraints imposed by
justification and precedent do not depend upon public
statements accurately portraying private beliefs."

He

accurately concludes there is "a socially defined dis
tinction between legitimate and illegitimate justific
atory arguments."2 While Anderson is discussing public
statements by political leaders, there is no reason to

xThe framework focussing on and the distinction
between internal and external justifications was first
made by David Dessler in "Structural Origins of Major
War," (Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University,
1987). While our use of the terms is slightly modified,
there is considerable overlap between Dessler's use of
the terms and the manner in which they are used in this
study.
2Paul Anderson, "Justifications and Precedents as
Constraints in Foreign Policy Decision-Making," American
Journal of Political Science (November 1981): 741, 745.
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think that justificatory statements supporting some
recommendation within the inner realm are not subject to
similar constraints.

Therefore, one can expand the

notion of "illegitimate and legitimate" arguments and
claim:

Policy-makers justify actions or recommendations

in a manner they believe will be acceptable to a given
audience.

External Justification
Decision-makers and political leaders justify pol
icies and potential policies through moral arguments,
legal arguments, ideological arguments or in terms of the
national interest.3

In the external realm, the legal,

moral and ideological arguments are often emphasized to
cultivate a certain image of the state or government

3It is rare that a policy-maker would ever justify
some course of action in terms of his or her own personal
interest since this would likely be an unacceptable type
of justification to any audience that we are discussing
here.
Imagine a Vice President standing up in an N.S.C.
meeting or at a press conference saying, "I advocate that
U.S. foreign policy should support the anti-Sandinista
forces in Nicaragua because I own stock in a company
whose assets were frozen after the revolution." Even if
that were the way he felt, he would be much more likely
to argue that the policy should be adopted for reasons
more palatable to his audience. This example demon
strates t'he potential difference between what actually
motivates action and the justification given for that
action (whether in the internal or external realms). For
more detailed discussion of this point see Anderson, 745.
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justifying its policy.

The United States policy toward

the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua has been justified for
years in a manner that stresses the moral and ideological
facets of American policy.

In his televised address to

the nation on May 9, 1984, President Reagan explained
U.S. policy toward Central America and asked the American
people and Congress to support administration policy
there.4 He asserted the U.S. goal was "to promote demo
cracy and economic well being" in the region.

After

briefly describing U.S. interests in the region in terms
of trade, the Panama Canal, and the geographic proximity
to the United States, Reagan embarked on an extended
criticism of the "Sandinista reign of terror."

The

particular policies that the President was defending were
economic and military aid for the democratic governments
in the region and military assistance to the "freedom
fighters" in Nicaragua.

Reagan concluded, "The United

States must continue to support both the elected Govern
ment of El Salvador and the democratic aspirations of the
Nicaraguan people."

He went on to explain that the

contras were the force representing the democratic aspir
ations of the Nicaraguan people.

The full force of the

4For a text of President Reagan's speech see "U.S.
Interests in Central America," Department of State Bul
letin, June 1984, 22-26.
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moral and ideological aspects of the external justifica
tion surfaced as the President made a pointed pitch for
public support of his policies.
If the Soviet Union can aid and abet subversion
in our hemisphere, then the United States has a
legal right and a moral duty to help resist it.
It would be profoundly immoral to let peaceloving friends depending on our help be over
whelmed by brute force if we have any capacity
to prevent it."5
A number of more recent policy statements by the
Reagan administration show more clearly that external
justifications are characterized by an emphasis on moral
and ideological arguments.

(It will be shown later that

internal justifications reflect a greater concern for
national interests).

During a news conference on Feb

ruary 24, 1988, President Reagan spoke on U.S. policy in
Central America.

Roughly 80 percent of the speech con

cerned the plight of the "people of Nicaragua" and the
need for democracy in that country.6

In ideologically

charged rhetoric Reagan repeatedly referred to the contras as "the democratic resistance" and "freedom fight-

5Ibid., 25.
6The author performed an unscientific content anal
ysis of the text of the speech to determine that 4/5 of
the speech was concerned with moral arguments for U.S.
policy. For a copy of the speech see "News Conference of
February 24," Department of State Bulletin, May 1988, 912 .
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ers.11 After lauding the progress of the other govern
ments in Central America, Reagan concluded, "One country,
Nicaragua, with its communist regime, remains a threat to
this democratic tide in the region."7
President Reagan's statement was seconded by Sec
retary of State George Shultz two weeks later in a speech
before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the
House Appropriations Committee.

Like his boss, Secretary

Shultz focussed on the "brutality of the communists" and
the need for Congress and the American people to reaffirm
"our commitment to forces fighting for peace and freedom"
in Nicaragua.8 By reinforcing the President's views,
Shultz strengthened the hand of the administration when
it faced opposition in Nicaragua and in Congress.

To

display disagreement in the external realm would appear
as a sign of a lack of resolve.
The appearance of unity within the government is an
important aspect of the external justification.

Usually,

there is a single theme running throughout all external
discussions of a given policy by administration sources.
A government needs to maintain the appearance of unity on

7Ibid., 11.
8For a copy of Shultz's address before Congress see
"Meeting Our Foreign Policy Goals," Department of State
Bulletin, May 1988, 12-13.
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major foreign policy issues if it is to be taken serious
ly by other states.

A lack of unity may damage the

ability of the government to effectively carry out its
policies.

A good example of the difficulties arising

from open disagreement was the debate between Secretary
of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbig
niew Brzezinski, which inhibited the effectiveness of the
Carter administration's foreign policy.

In June 1978

Carter tried to clearly explain U.S. policy toward the
Soviet Union, which at that time appeared ambiguous
because of the public disagreement between the Presi
dent's two leading advisors on the issue.

Vance empha

sized the need for detente, regional settlements, and
arms control, while Brzezinski supported a harder line
toward Moscow.

The two most important administration

spokesmen on foreign affairs, other than the president,
were sending radically different signals to the Kremlin
and to America's allies.9 Consequently, it was a widely
held view that the administration did not establish a
consensus or have a clear policy on a number of the most
important issues involving the foreign policy of the

9Former White House speech writer for President
Carter, James Fallows, discusses the problems of a public
split in administration ranks in "The Passionless Pres
idency," in Behind The Scenes in American Government, ed.
Peter Woll (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1983), 172-173.
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United States.

President Carter went to great lengths to

quell rumors of disunity; at one time he went so far as
to make a speech for the express purpose of establishing
a unified official line.10

If the international audience

is unsure about the commitment and resolve of the
American government toward its stated policies, allies
may be less willing to lend support and adversaries may
be emboldened.

For this reason, any leading member of

the executive who opposes some policy in the internal
debate is nevertheless expected to support and justify
the policy in terms that are consistent with the official
line.
More recently, potential disunity within an admin
istration— which threatened to damage the effectiveness
of policy— was averted by the Reagan administration when

10In 1978 President Carter delivered a speech on
U.S.-Soviet relations at the Naval Academy's graduation
exercises. According to White House spokesmen, Carter
decided to draft the speech himself "to erase the impres
sion that his administration was deeply divided on na
tional security policy." Robert C. Kaiser and Walter
Pinkus, "Carter as Speechwriter: Limiting Split." Wash
ington Post, June 8 1978, A18. The address failed to
remedy the public perception of disunity; in fact, as the
front page headline in the next day's paper indicated,
the differences between various elements of the admin
istration were actually accentuated. See Murrey Marder,
"Two Different Speeches," Washington Post, June 8 1978,
Al, and A20. Apparently a memo written by Vance served
as the basis for the first two pages while Brzezinski's
Cold War rhetoric was reflected in the remainder of the
speech.
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it maintained an unambiguous line on its controversial
Strategic Defense Initiative (S.D.I.).

Shortly after

President Reagan presented his vision of a ballistic
missile defense system to the American people in March
1983, there was speculation that S.D.I. was to be used as
a bargaining chip in arms control negotiations with the
Soviet Union.

Specifically, a number of mid-level

bureaucrats in the State Department and the Defense
Department who were involved in the A.B.M. Treaty negoti
ations favored S.D.I. only as an inducement to the Krem
lin— a goody to be given away.

However, in response to

this type of speculation and rumor, the administration's
leading policy makers indicated their official unwavering
support for the program, which was heralded as a step
that would increase the stability of the strategic bal
ance by enhancing deterrence while seeking a permanent
solution to the problem of nuclear war.

The pro-S.D.I.

arguments offered by most officials were more subtle than
the defensive shield imagined by President Reagan, but
they did not contradict him on the U.S. commitment to
eventual deployment.

It is almost certain that not all

these administration spokesmen felt this was the best
reason to proceed with S.D.I. or that the U.S. should
adopt the policy at all.

But the adherence to and ap-
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parent acceptance of the single external justification
gave the policy added weight and political utility.
(Since everyone seemed serious about an effort to deploy
a B.M.D. system, it really did make the Soviets sit up
and take notice.)
Because the open collegial system which operates in
the United States is not conducive to the type of focus
and consensus needed in foreign affairs, U.S. administra
tions are acutely aware of the danger posed by apparent
disharmony within the government.

Observers often re

flect on the role of Congress in the American political
system when explaining the patch work nature of U.S.
foreign policy outputs.

Ralph Dahrendorf suggests, "In

the United States, quite contrary to its Constitutional
assumptions, there is no simple notion of 'the execu
tive' ; parts of Congress are involved in the great con
sensus .1,11
Repeated cases of Congressional involvement in the
foreign policy consensus can be seen in the Reagan ad
ministration's Central American program.

The executive's

policy was watered down by Congress on the issue of

“Ralph Dahrendorf, "On the Governability of Demo
cracies, " in Comparative Politics, ed. Roy C. Macridis
and Bernard D. Brown (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1986),
390.
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military aid to the contras, which was supposed to pres
sure the Sandinistas toward democratic reforms.12 Experts
in the N.S.C., the State Department and the Central
Intelligence Agency calculated that the U.S.-backed
contras would need certain resources to achieve certain
objectives.

(The Reagan administration, not the bureau

cratic specialists, defined the objectives.)

The ad

ministration requested money (100,000 dollars) from the
legislature— as it must for any program— -to aid the
contras.

In March 1986 Congress appropriated the funds

with the stipulation that the money be used only for non
combat purposes.

According to administration sources,

this amendment undercut the effectiveness of U.S. policy
in Nicaragua.

It certainly sent contradictory signals to

American allies in the region who had been promised
military support.

Whether one agrees with the policy or

not, the example demonstrates how carefully planned

12The real reason for and the internal justification
for contra aid is a contentious point. Some observers,
like Congressmen Edward Boland and journalist Bob Wood
ward, insist the purpose of creating and supporting the
resistance forces in Nicaragua was to overthrow the
Nicaraguan government.
The intricacies of the internal
justification for this issue will be discussed in detail
later. See Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the
C .I .A. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 134-136,
175. See also the text of the "Boland Amendment."
Continuing Resolution for Appropriations, United States
Statutes at Large, 96, sec. 793 (Nicaragua and Honduras),
1865 (21 December 1982) .
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policies of the executive can be altered so the appear
ance of unity is destroyed.
A headache facing all American Presidents is the
appearance of disunity as a result of the plethora of
would-be Secretaries of State.

The most recent leading

American diplomat, Speaker of the House James Wright,
decided to enter negotiations with Nicaraguan President
Daniel Ortega in November 1987 after the Reagan admin
istration consistently refused to do so.

The difference

between the administration's hard line toward the Sandinistas and the direct negotiations in Washington bet
ween the Nicaraguan leader and a highly visible member of
the United States Congress was construed as contradictory
American policy.

The Reagan administration complained

that Wright's actions threatened to undercut the U.S.
position of strength relative to the Sandinistas and its
commitment to the contras.13
Some observers feel the costs of disunity are so
great that institutional changes should be made to en
courage coherence in foreign policy.

George Kennan,

former head of the State Department's Policy Planning
Staff (P.P.S.), has argued repeatedly for constitutional

13John Goshko, "Reagan Hits Wright on Peace Talks,"
Washington Post, 17 November 1987, A22.

19
reform "which would give us a parliamentary system more
nearly like that which exists in England."

He insists

"that Congress should leave the executors of policy
unmolested so that they may consistently apply their
expert knowledge in ways they have learned to know are
wise."14
Finally, legal, as well as moral and ideological
claims are an important part of the external justifica
tion of policy.

It would be highly irregular for a

decision-maker to argue for a certain policy on the basis
of international law in the internal realm.

While he may

be concerned with enhancing the state's appearance as a
law abiding member of the international order, it is
unlikely a decision-maker would support a policy simply
because it conformed to or upheld a non-domestic legal
code.

However, the use of international law and treaty

commitments to explain policies in the external realm
appears to lend a degree of legitimacy to policy and is
therefore used frequently in public statements.

In July

1981 administration spokesmen before the Subcommittee on
International Security Affairs defended the U.S. policy
of military aid and arms transfers to friendly govern-

14George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy: 1900-1950
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 73, 94.
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ments in Central and South America.

"We are committed

both by longstanding policy and by the Rio Treaty, to
join with our Latin American allies in 'mutual assistance
and common defense of the American republics.'1,15
The external justification is the alleged real
reason for action.16
define.

It is relatively clear and easy to

In fact the State Department, which is respon

sible for the formulation and explanation of U.S. foreign
policy, releases official statements on most major policy
issues.

Often these official statements are explained

and elaborated in press conferences, speeches, or The
Department of State Bulletin.

The internal justification

is often less coherent and much harder to define than the
external justification.

Some of the characteristics of

the internal justification are outlined below; however,
the complex relationship between the internal and exter
nal realms is more fully elaborated in later case
studies.

15For a partial transcript of the testimony before
the subcommittee on International Security Affairs see
"U.S. Arms Transfers Policy Toward Latin America," De
partment of State Bulletin, December 1981, 72.
16Dessler, 161.
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Internal Justification
As in the external realm, justifications in the
internal realm are characterized by arguments of national
interest, ideology, legality and morality.

However,

unlike the external realm, there is a premium in the
internal realm on weighing interests rather than subor
dinating policy to universal values, international legal
codes or ideological considerations.

During discussions

within the N.S.C., a participant might suggest that the
policy of the United States toward Nicaragua should be to
support the anti-Sandinista resistance forces there.

In

an attempt to convince other members of the N.S.C., the
advocate of this action might support his stance by
claiming such an option enhances the physical security of
the United States.

This would be a justification based

on "national interests."

On the other hand, he may argue

for the same policy by claiming, as many have, that it is
the moral obligation of the United States' government to
support those forces in the world struggling for demo
cracy and freedom so that all persons may enjoy their
inalienable rights.

Often the two arguments are inter

woven and presented so they appear mutually reinforcing.
In this example, the advocate would claim that because
democratic forms of government are less likely to

22
threaten the United States than authoritarian govern
ments, the U.S. ought to support the democratic forces in
that country.

In this way, the moral argument becomes an

argument of national interest.

If the preceding policy

recommendation is accepted by the executive branch, the
arguments offered above may become part of the internal
justification for the policy.

However, this does not

imply that any argument offered in favor of the policy is
part of the internal justification.

To define the inter

nal justification as a general theoretical category is
considerably more difficult than pinpointing the external
justification, which is offered in its entirety in writ
ten and spoken form.

Because of the manner in which

policy is made, it would be incorrect to expect a single,
coherent internal justification similar in form to the
external one.

The ambiguity of the internal realm is, in

part, a consequence of the policy process.
A central problem in determining the internal jus
tification for any policy or defining what constitutes an
internal justification in general arises from the com
plexities of the policy process itself.

To imagine

policy-making as an exercise in which fully planned and
justified policy options are chosen from a pool of such

23
options is highly misleading.17 And yet, the presentation
of the final policy with its comprehensive explanations
gives the impression that the state could have chosen
policy A, B, or C, whichever seemed best suited to
achieve the purpose of furthering its national interests.
This view assumes that governments act as their external
justifications attempt to make them appear to act— with
unity of purpose and with unanimous agreement on the
means and ends to be employed.

In other words, it as

sumes the state is a unitary rational actor.

In this

view the state is viewed as a single person who relates
means to ends in the most efficient way possible given
finite information.

Viotti and Kauppi explain the ra

tional unitary-actor assumption: "The state speaks with
one voice.

. . . Given particular goals, states consider

feasible alternatives to achieve these goals in the light
of their existing capabilities.

. . . decision-makers

17A number of theorists and even some political
leaders have viewed the policy process in this way. For
example, Jimmy Carter once referred to his job as "one
big multiple choice exam." As Bueno de Mesquita
explains, ". . . each person rates alternatives as more
or less desirable and chooses his or her most preferred
alternative. . . .decision-makers calculate the costs
and benefits of the alternatives open to them and choose
the one that seems to yield the greatest advantage."
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Forecasting Political Events
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 19.
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strive to achieve the best possible decision."18 Even if
Bueno de Mesquita is correct and people do make decisions
on the basis of maximizing expected utility, there is
still no reason to assume state decisions are made in a
unitary fashion or that the output will reflect such
focus and coherence.
Instead of completely "rational" policies that might
be like those expected from a single individual, most
policies are the result of considerable compromise and
revision.

As Graham T. Allison explains,

Government behavior can thus be understood . .
. as outcomes of bargaining games. . . . The
bureaucratic politics model sees no unitary
actor but rather many actors as players, who
focus not on a single strategic issue but on
many diverse intranational problems as well, in
terms of no consistent set of strategic objec
tives but rather according to various concep
tions of national, organizational, and personal
goals, making government decisions not by ra
tional choice but by the pulling and hauling
that is politics.19
Coherent policy options and comprehensive plans are
quickly compromised and watered down by questioners and
detractors when they enter the process characterized by

18Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, International Rela
tions Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (London:
Macmillan, 1987), 32-33.
19Graham T. Allison, "Bureaucratic Politics," in
Bureaucratic Power in National Politics, ed. Francis E.
Rourke (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1978), 182.
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discussion and debate.

The final product rarely resem

bles the A, B, or C put forth by any one participant, but
is instead an agglomeration or some combination of A, B,
and C .20
While Congress plays a role in the policy process,
internal justification is usually the product of bargain
ing and compromise within the executive branch.

The most

important "pulling and hauling" in the internal realm
takes place at the upper levels of the executive branch
in cabinet level meetings and, on questions of foreign
policy, in the National Security Council.
The N.S.C. was established by the National Security
Act of 1947.

Its statutory members are the President,

Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of
Defense.

Since the Eisenhower administration, presidents

have regularly called on various other department heads
and advisors to sit on the N.S.C.

Thus, the Director of

Central Intelligence, the National Security Advisor, and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now de
facto members of the N.S.C.

All the members (with the

possible exception of the National Security Advisor) are

20According to Allison, "What the nation does is
sometimes the result of the triumph of one group over
others. More often, however, different groups pulling in
different directions yield a resultant distinct from what
anyone intended.
Ibid., 183.
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beholden to some institutional or electoral constituency.
In their capacity as advisors to the president, all these
individuals approach policy questions with certain inter
ests and outlooks shaped by their responsibilities as
department heads or elected officials.21

Therefore, an

agreement on what policy option maximizes the national
interest is unlikely; and even if all the assembled
members calculate the national interest in the same
manner, there is no guarantee that institutional inter
ests or personal biases will not be calculated as equally
important.

Since the policy process is characterized by

a number of participants with different outlooks and
different interests,22 the outputs of a state are not the
result of unitary rational choice as defined above.23

21In their investigation of the Iran/contra affair,
the Tower Commission judged the N.S.C. in much the same
way Allison had. They held the N.S.C. is ". . . biased
toward reaching consensus among these principals rather
than developing options for Presidential decision." The
Tower Commission Report (New York; Bantam Books Inc. and
Times Books Inc., 1987), 12. For more complete discus
sion see 6-15.
22Thomas E. Cronin estimates there are " . . . more
than fifty federal departments, agencies, and committees
involved in some way in the administration or evaluation
of U.S. foreign policy." The State of the Presidency
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1975), 193.
23For a discussion of the effect of various organiza
tional interests on the policy process see Morton Halpern, Bureaucratic Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy
(Washington D.C.; The Brookings Institution, 1974);
Graham T. Allison, Essence of a Decision: Explaining the
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Of course, formal meetings of the N.S.C., N.S.P.G.,
P.P.S. or special committees formed to plan or implement
foreign policy are not the only source of internal debate
and justification.

All levels of the executive branch

communicate with one another through memos and reports
that circulate within and among the White House, American
embassies over seas, Congressional committees and the
various bureaucracies.

Informal meetings and conversa

tions undoubtedly help define policies and justifica
tions; but they are the most difficult to study.
Given the complexities and numerous inputs in the foreign
policy process, one can appreciate the difficulty in
determining the internal justification for any policy.
Nevertheless, one needs some criteria for determining
what constitutes an internal justification.
A set of reasons becomes part of the internal jus
tification if it appears the elaboration of those reasons
significantly affects the direction or composition of the
policy chosen.

One can judge this by frequent appearance

of the same argument in the official record, such as
internal memoranda and minutes of meetings, and to a
lesser degree in memoirs, letters and diaries of the

Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little Brown and Co.,
1971).
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participants.

One can also determine the effect of any

view or justification on policy by knowing which par
ticipants in the policy process possess the most influ
ence on the issue.

For example, if the President and the

Secretary of State both argue for a policy and justify it
with X, while an assistant Undersecretary of Defense
justifies the same policy with Y, one can conclude that X
is more important in shaping the chosen option and in
causing its adoption as U.S. policy.

In this case, if X

and Y are mutually exclusive, then Y will not be con
sidered part of the internal justification.

If X and Y

are not exclusive, then Y might help comprise the inter
nal justification, but considerations expressed in X will
be paramount.

There are exceptions to the rules which

define these theoretical categories, but as explained
later, the categories are nevertheless useful in under
standing policy decisions.
Determining the relative importance of various
actors in the policy process is not always a simple task.
The confusion following the public exposure of the Irancontra affair demonstrates the difficulty of uncovering
and defining the internal justification.

In this case a

number of leading administration officials, notably
Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary
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Caspar Weinberger, opposed the plan of dealing with a
state known to support terrorist movements.

President

Reagan, who was in close contact with the families of
hostages in the Middle East, was most concerned about the
welfare of those Americans in captivity.

National Secur

ity Advisor Robert McFarlane saw the operation as a way
to open channels of communication with moderate elements
inside the Iranian government.

For McFarlane the deal

provided an opportunity for a strategic opening through
improved American-Iranian relations.

Finally, Oliver

North and later Admiral John Poindexter supported the
action for all the reasons outlined above; but as their
testimony at Congressional hearings clearly showed, both
embraced the plan primarily as a means to skirt legal
constraints placed on the administration's program of
support for the contras.
Because the President chose to proceed with the
policy based on X, one might expect the internal jus
tification elaborated by him to be paramount.

However,

the nature of the operation was such that Col. North had
hands-on control.

Consequently, while Reagan's X may

have given the policy its initial acceptance, the results
of the operation indicates it was carried out with
North's concerns in mind.

It is not surprising then,
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that North's primary objective of supplying the contras
was largely achieved by the operation.

On the other

hand, the administration made minimal gains in its ef
forts to obtain the release of hostages by dealing with
the Iranians.24
If the variety of objectives and justifications
given for the Iran-contra operation are not confusing
enough, there is an additional problem involving the
apparent lack of knowledge on the part of key administra
tion officials.

None of the bodies created to inves

tigate the issue have been able to definitively determine
who knew about important aspects of the operation.

The

apparent ignorance of key issues extended all the way up
to the President.

Fitting events into the categories

outlined above is difficult just two years after the
revelation of the policy; and as the wealth of material
written on the subject suggests, there may always be
disagreement on what the internal justification for the
administration's policy was.25

24The United States gave military supplies to the
Iranians on four occasions, each time with the expecta
tion of obtaining the release of one or more hostages.
After all transactions had been completed, only two
hostages were released and both those at much higher cost
than originally promised.
25A combination of sources gives the broadest picture
concerning the internal dynamics of the Iran-contra
initiative.
See The Tower Commission Report; The Nation
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Unlike the abstract framework outlined above, the
internal and external realms are sometimes not completely
distinct, especially in an open political system such as
that which operates in the United States.

Frequently

members of Congress, allied governments and private
interest groups penetrate the internal realm, making the
theoretical categories actually more porous than their
stated parameters indicate.

As the Iran-contra example

demonstrates, the criteria which define the stated theo
retical categories are not necessarily accurate descrip
tions of reality.

Other historical cases reinforce this

discrepancy between theory and practice.
During discussions at the White House in early 1965,
leading members of Congress were invited to participate
in the policy process and were privy to what must be
considered the internal justification for the decision to
commit ground combat forces in Vietnam.26

In a slightly

different way the barrier between the internal and exter
nal realms was breached during the Reagan administra
tion's initial decision to provide aid to the contras in

al Security Archive's report, The Chronology: Account of
Secret Military Assistance to Iran (New York: Warner
Books, 1987); and Woodward, 412-503.
26A more detailed study of this point will be made in
Chapter Three.

32
the early 1980's.
was forced by

In this instance the administration

law to inform Congressional intelligence

oversight committees of ongoing covert operations.
Committee members were exposed to at least a part of the
internal justification for the policy which created and
sustained an anti-communist guerrilla force in Central
America.

The Reagan administration informed the commit

tees that the rationale for such a policy was the inter
diction of military supplies entering El Salvador.
However, because some members correctly suspected ul
terior motives of the administration, such as the des
tabilization and eventual overthrow of the regime in
Managua, the pledge of silence was broken and they leaked
the operation to the press.

The oversight committees

were designed to give Congress an insider's view of the
policy process, but only a very weak influence on actual
policy formulation.27

When members thought they were not

being offered the actual internal justification, which

27What influence the committees do have stems from
their "expected reaction" to a policy which is taken into
account by the executive. The committees do not normally
participate in the process by offering policy options as
the executive branch players might.
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the administration feared might appear unacceptable, they
leaked.28
While the internal-external model employs an artifi
cial taxonomy which often simplifies aspects of the
decision-making process, its categories are nevertheless
useful as analytical tools.

This framework offers three

benefits to the observer of foreign affairs.

First, it

offers a system of classificatory terms with which one
can uniformly define numerous events and cases over a
broad range of issue areas.

While each case is made up

of particular details, the internal-external paradigm
makes them comprehensible by revealing details as recurr
ing phenomena in the policy process.

Even though the

internal and external realms may overlap in individual
cases, the dichotomy offers an exhaustive classificatory
scheme through which one can approach questions of jus
tification ..

280ne reason for the hesitancy on the part of the
executive branch to fully elaborate the internal jus
tification is conditioned by a suspicion that the Con
gressional committees leak information obtained in closed
hearings. See The Tower Commission Report, 98. This
same concern was voiced in 1965 by National Security
Advisor McGeorge Bundy when he warned Johnson, "It is
quite possible the (private) message to the Congress,
once the President has determined our position, would be
a message to the public." As quoted in George Kahin's,
Intervention: How America Became Involved In Vietnam (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 369.
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Second, the distinction between internal and exter
nal justificatory realms and the accompanying limits of
each encourage the author and the reader to probe for
"real" reasons and the essence of decisions.

Too often,

foreign policy analysts draw conclusions and support
arguments based on public proclamations of governments.
By highlighting the internal-external dichotomy and
keeping in mind the audiences of particular justifica
tions, one will be less likely to search for the causes
of policy in contrived presentations.

This does not

suggest that actual causes of policy can not be found in
external justifications, but only that the analyst must
be skeptical and attempt to find explanations consistent
with the perceived interests of the state and the policy
makers .
Third, there may be a relationship between a diver
gence (or convergence) and the success, coherence, or
acceptability of a policy.

For example, it may be that

under certain conditions the existence of a divergence
will increase the likelihood that a policy is successful
(or vice-versa).

To determine this, future research must

have a comprehensive and exhaustive scheme through which
to define and classify raw data.

If some correlation

becomes apparent, its existence would likely be of some
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interest to policy makers as well as analysts.
Given this preliminary understanding of the defini
tions and categories to be used in this study, it will be
helpful to apply theory to actual decisions.

In the

application of theory a number of causes and various
types of divergence between internal and external jus
tification will emerge.

By developing the relationship

between the internal and external realms, the utility of
the dichotomy for analysts, historians and policy-makers
becomes evident.
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CHAPTER II: CAUSES OF DIVERGENCE
The executive may encourage a difference between the
internal and external justifications -of a policy for a
number of reasons.

Some of the most obvious incentives

for a divergence are the need to maintain ideological
consistency, to score domestic political victories (or
prevent defeats), to secure the support of Congress and
the public, or to signal foreign allies and adversaries.
By examining historical cases it will become clear how
various considerations of the executive motivate diver
gences between justificatory arguments in the external
and internal realms.

The Period of Creation
The formative years of America's post-war foreign
policy are highly instructive for any examination of the
internal-external dichotomy.

The global power vacuum

left by the destruction of Japan and Germany and the
severe weakening of the European colonial powers opened
the door for the most materially rich and powerful nation
in the world, the United States, to play the leading role
in determining the shape of the post-war world.

Of all

the major powers, only the United States emerged from the
war with sufficient economic and military strength to
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successfully organize a global recovery.

The Truman

administration sought to consolidate America's new posi
tion as world leader, but this would require major com
mitments of money and material to foreign countries.
Because of isolationist traditions and a fiscally conser
vative Congress, the administration's foreign policy
goals faced substantial domestic impediments.

By 1947

America was completing a post-war reduction in its armed
forces and defense budget; gaining public and Congres
sional support for even relatively small foreign aid
packages proved politically troublesome.

For example, in

194 6 it took six months to get a British reconstruction
loan through Congress and then only after vicious debate.
Reluctance on the part of the legislature to extend aid
to Britain was surprising, given the closeness of the
Anglo-American relationship developed during the war, the
losses suffered by the British and the relative popu
larity of Britain with the American public.1

1For a discussion of the politics of the loan see
Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis (New York: W.W.
Norton and Company, 1977), 281. See also H.B. Price, The
Marshall Plan and Its Meaning (Ithica, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1955), 71-74. Former Secretary of
State Dean Acheson described the attitude of the legis
lators toward European aid in early 1947 as "one of
hardly suppressed skepticism." Dean Acheson, Present at
the Creation (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1969),
221 .
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Britain's retreat from Greece, India, and the Middle
East in early 1947 signalled its inability to continue to
play the role of world policeman.

Therefore, the Truman

administration determined major economic and military aid
programs would be necessary to ensure political stability
and economic recovery in those areas of the world vital
to America's interests.

The single most important step

which set the United States on a course for world leader
ship— and which also paved the way for the Marshall Plan
and the formation of the Atlantic Alliance— was the
decision to provide Greece and Turkey with economic,
administrative and military aid sufficient to maintain
their governments.2 Soon after he asked Congress to fund
this program, the President's message became widely
acclaimed as the "Truman Doctrine."
Throughout 194 6 Greece and Turkey became focal
points in the escalating war of words and ideas between
the Soviet Union and the Western powers.

The Greek

2According to Joseph M. Jones of the Office of Pub
lic Affairs and a participant in the policy discussions,
"All. . . were aware that a major turning point in
American history was taking place." Cited in Acheson,
220. See also Louis J. Halle, who interprets the Truman
Doctrine as "a new and definitive formulation of
America's place and policy in the world." The Cold War
as History (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 109-112.
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government was losing control of the country in its civil
war against Soviet supported insurgents.

Turkey was

repeatedly threatened by its Russian neighbor to the
North; in August, 1946, Moscow demanded basing rights in
the Bosporous.

By early 1947 Britain's own economic woes

made it increasingly difficult to ensure the continued
existence of the Greek government or to maintain its own
40,000 troops in that country.

In February Britain's

Ambassador in Washington delivered a message to the State
Department indicating his government's intention to cease
economic aid and recall its military personnel from
Greece and Turkey in six weeks.

The British abdicated

with the hope that the United States would assume the
burden in Turkey and Greece.

Internal Rationale for Greek-Turkish Aid
The decision to aid Greece and Turkey was shaped,
in part, by a larger struggle developing between the
superpowers.

After the enthusiastic adoption of George

Kennan's "Long Telegram" by official Washington in early
*

194 6, foreign policy deliberations were infused with the
need to contain the Soviet Union.

The extension of

Soviet power was assumed to be facilitated not just by
the advance of the Red Army but by communist parties
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operating outside Moscow's orbit.

For this reason many

of the internal justifications for the decision to aid
Greece and Turkey were implicit in the adoption of the
policy.

This becomes frighteningly clear when reviewing

accounts of the decision-making process during this
period.

The discussion and debate surrounding the policy

in the internal realm focussed on time-tables and capab
ilities rather than reasons for adopting the policy.

Few

questioned whether it should be adopted at all.3 The
central questions were 'how,' 'when,' and 'with what,'
rather than 'why.'4 As soon as the British informed the

3George Kennan claimed to be part of a committee
assigned "the task of recommending whether to respond
affirmatively at all to the problem posed for us by the
British withdrawal, or whether to leave the Greeks and
Turks to their own devices." However, the chairman of
the committee, Loy Henderson, and the acting Secretary of
State, Dean Acheson, insist that question had been decid
ed the day after the British note was received. As far
as Acheson and Henderson were concerned the primary
purpose of the committee was "to make suggestions as to
how it (the decision to aid Greece and Turkey) should be
explained and justified to other governmental depart
ments, to Congress (whose action would obviously be
necessary to give it effect), and to the public." See
George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1967), 313-314; and Acheson, 217-219.
4Acheson, who was acting Secretary of State while
General George Marshall attended the foreign ministers
meeting in Moscow, assigned State Department analysts to
determine "(1) facts as seen by the United States repre
sentatives; (2) funds and personnel currently available;
(3) funds and personnel needed;" and only fourth, "si
gnificance of an independent Greece and Turkey to Western
Europe." The assumption built into this list was that
American interests were intimately related to political
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United States of its intention to withdraw, Truman and
his advisors unanimously agreed on the necessity to
provide Greece and Turkey with aid.5 Nevertheless, while
the internal justifications were neither explicit nor
were they the central focus of the internal discussions
on the issue, they did exist.
The maintenance of a certain type of world order was
viewed as the primary interest motivating the decision to
aid Greece and Turkey.

This meant that American deci

sion-makers adopted policies that would:

(1) promote

global peace and stability and (2) Encourage global
economic recovery.

These goals were thought to be mutu

ally reinforcing since global peace and stability would
naturally benefit the growth and recovery of the world
economy.

In essence, this meant keeping the industrial

ized Western countries unified, something which had not
been achieved in the inter-war period.

and economic vitality in Western Europe.

A related con

Ibid., 217-219.

5When the administration realized that only the
United States had the capability to prevent a collapse of
the Greek government and ensure that Turkey not "become
an untenable outpost in a sea of Communism," it earnestly
assumed that responsibility.
It is almost as if the mere
existence of a vacuum was an incentive for the strongest
power to fill it. Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and
Hope (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company Inc.,
1956), 100. See also Donovan, 279.
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sideration of decision-makers had, by 194 7, become almost
a cliche'.

The "lessons of Munich" and the folly of

appeasement had become operational guidelines for the
conduct of U.S. policy.

Truman, Acheson, Marshall and

even parts of the professional bureaucracy were quick to
substitute Stalin for Hitler and the Soviet Union for
Nazi Germany.6
The specific reasons offered in the internal realm
to preserve Greek and Turkish independence in the face of
Soviet pressure all related to the broader issues dis
cussed above.

While no one seriously raised the pos

sibility of a Soviet invasion of Greece, Turkey or
Western Europe, there was concern that these areas might
be "lost by default."

Marshall used this phrase repeat

edly when explaining the potentially adverse effects of
American indolence in this and comparable cases.7

6In 1945 Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew may
have been the first within the administration to draw the
parallel when he claimed the Soviet Union "will consti
tute, in the future, as grave a threat to us as did the
axis." Cited in Hugh Thomas, Armed Truce: The Beginnings
of the Cold War, 1945-46 (New York: Atheneum, 1987), 137138. In a letter to his wife one day after his famous
speech to Congress of March 12, Truman wrote he had known
at Potsdam "that there is no difference between total
itarian or police states, call them what you will, Nazi,
Fascist, Communist, or Argentine Republics." Donovan,
285.
7"Statement by the Secretary of State," Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1947, Vol. 5, 60-62.
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Similarly, historian Herbert Feis explains it was not
invasion, but political and military blackmail through
which the Soviets could achieve their goals in Turkey.
"American and British officials became nervous lest the
Turks cave in and accede to Russian demands."

To prevent

a Kremlin-inspired Turko-Russian settlement, the American
administration agreed with its counterpart in London that
aid from the United States was needed as an unambiguous
show of support.8 George Kennan expressed the same view
in broader terms.

Kennan, who by 1947 was the head of

the State Department's newly created Policy Planning
Staff (P.P.S.), claimed the Soviet threat existed prim
arily in a political form; consequently, as long as the
countries of Western Europe remained economically and
politically vibrant, communism would make no significant
inroads.

Were the United States to abandon Europe,

however, allowing its economic position to continue to
deteriorate, the resulting chaos and destruction would be
a breeding ground for communism.

In that case, suggested

Kennan, forces loyal to Moscow could score political
victories and the governments of those countries might be

8Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror (New York: W.W.
Norton and Company, 1970), 178-183.
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forced to deal with the Soviet Union on unfavorable
terms.9
A number of Truman's top advisors agreed that the
U.S. should aid Greece and Turkey because a failure to
act could have substantial negative repercussions on
political stability in Europe and the state of order in
the world.10

Specifically, they argued that those demo

cratic forces in Italy and France under pressure from
domestic communist parties would suffer a considerable
psychological blow were Greece allowed to fall to the
communists.

While their own material conditions and

security would not be threatened by the collapse of the
Greek government, Kennan claimed "it was hard to overes
timate, in those days of uncertainty and economic dif
ficulty, the cumulative effect of sensational political
events.,,n

9Kennan, 317, 351.
10In a March 1947 memorandum to Acheson, Under
secretary of State William Clayton urged that 5 billion
dollars be appropriated to help the devastated non-com
munist countries.
"The United States must take world
leadership and quickly," he said, "to avert world dis
aster." As cited in Donovan, 283.
nAs Kennan explained in a lecture at the National
War College, "it is the shadows rather than the substance
of things that moves the hearts, and sway the deeds of
statesmen." Kennan, 318, 330-331, 351. For similar
arguments by other participants in the policy process see
Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance
(Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1981), 25-26; and John
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The fate of other nations in the Middle East was of
considerable importance to American plans since oil from
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states would likely
fuel any European economic recovery.

Therefore, anything

that threatened the flow of oil from the Middle East to
Europe, such as the isolation of Turkey, the fall of
Greece or the control of Iran by Soviet sponsored forces,
was a grave concern of the administration in 1947.12
The importance of economic reconstruction was uncon
tested in the internal realm.

There was consensus that

an obvious national interest was at stake.

The produc

tive capacity of the United States had doubled during
World War II.

If the rest of the world, especially

Western Europe, did not recover economically, there was a
real danger that America would slip back into another
»

depression.

As Barton Bernstein explains, "American

democracy and prosperity at home depended upon an expand
ing world economy and the extension of democracy

L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1982), 35.
12For a discussion of the importance placed on
American and European access to Middle Eastern oil during
this period see Ireland, 51; Steven Spiegel, The Other
Arab-Israeli Conflict (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1985), 30-35, 47; and "Cafferey to Marshall,"
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Vol. Ill,
711.
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abroad."13 Bernstein's explanation echoes the rationale
found in a number of internal memoranda from the period.
Clayton explicitly advocated the Greek-Turkish aid pro
gram and later the Marshall Plan on the grounds that the
continuing deterioration of the West European economy
would have a "disastrous" effect on the American economy.
The specific results of European economic collapse would
be "Markets for our surplus product gone, unemployment,
depression, a heavily unbalanced budget on the background
of a mountainous war debt."

The Ad Hoc Committee of the

State-War-Navy Departments (S.W.N.C.C.), created in
February 194 7 to study the logistics and requirements of
assistance to Greece and Turkey and later to all of
Europe, reached similar conclusions,14

External Justification: The "Hard Sell"
While leading members of the administration were
convinced that the threat to American economic and secur
ity interests in Greece and Turkey was sufficient to

13Barton J. Bernstein, "Walter Lippmann and the Early
Cold War," in Cold War Critics, ed. Thomas G. Patterson
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 30.
14"The Director of the P.P.S. to the Under Secretary
of State," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947,
Vol.Ill, The British Commonwealth, Europe (Washington:
USGPO, 1972), 229-232.
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warrant an annual aid package of over 400 million dol
lars, they were not at all sure that Congress or the
American public would agree.

If the public and the

fiscally cautious Congress were not convinced of a severe
and imminent threat, they might be reluctant to support
the administration's proposed policy.

Truman, Acheson

and White House Staff Assistant Clark Clifford all felt
that the complex and often cynical arguments offered in
the internal realm— involving balance of power, spheres
of influence and expanding world trade— would do little
to convince legislators to allocate funds for or unite
the country behind the aid program.15

In fact, the ad

ministration made a conscious effort to "sell" the policy
to the Congress and the American people.16
Without the appearance of an imminent ideological
and military threat it is unclear whether Greek-Turkish
aid (or the Marshall Plan) would have passed Congress.
With this in mind, the administration employed a language

15For a detailed illustration of this point see David
S. McLellan, Dean Acheson: The State Department Years
(New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1976), 116-122; also
Ireland, 25-26.
“According to Joseph Jones, who was involved in
preparing Truman's famous speech to Congress, partici
pants in drafting sessions offered observations starting:
"The only way we can sell the public on our new policy
is. . . "A s cited in Halle, 119.
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of immediate crisis to move its programs through Congress
and allay public criticism.17

It also drew public com

parisons between the Soviet occupation of East European
countries and the largely domestic political opposition
in Greece and other European countries.

In an attempt to

present an image "clearer than truth" to its external
audience, the administration overstated the severity of
the Soviet military threat and marketed the policy as
part of a global ideological struggle.
On March 12, 1947, Truman spoke before a joint
session of Congress.

He explained that during World War

II Germany and Japan attempted to impose their way of
life on other nations and then implied the Soviet Union
was now doing the same.

He then continued:

We shall not realize our objectives . . . un
less we are willing to help free peoples to
maintain their free institutions and their
national integrity against aggressive movements
that seek to impose upon them totalitarian
regimes. . . . The peoples of a number of coun
tries of the world have recently had total
itarian regimes forced upon them against their
will. The Government of the United States has
made frequent protests against coercion and
intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agree
ment, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria.

17Athan Theoharis, "The Rhetoric of Politics: Foreign
Policy, Internal Security and Domestic Politics in the
Truman Administration," in Politics and Policies of the
Truman Administration, ed. Barton J. Bernstein (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970), 214-217.

Truman then came to the controversial core of his ad
dress: "I believe that it must be the policy of the
United States to support free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside
pressures.1,18
The "outside pressures" to which Truman referred
were undoubtedly allusions to the Soviet Union and its
proxy forces abetting the Greek guerrillas from Albania,
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

By highlighting the possibility

of Soviet military adventures in Europe, Truman opened a
floodgate of alarmist pronouncements, speeches, and
public studies which called attention to the apparent
military edge which the Soviet Union maintained over the
West in Europe.

Two years later such efforts greatly

facilitated the formation of the NATO Alliance.19
The fact that /the Soviet Union had a quantitative
superiority over Western forces stationed in Central
Europe is not disputed; however, there was a discrepancy
between the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet
Union as reported by American and British intelligence

18A s cited in Donovan, 284 .
19If one of the primary goals of the administration
was to avoid the divisions within the capitalist world
that existed during the inter-war period, the perception
of a Soviet threat and the subsequent formation of NATO
did much to facilitate that goal.
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agencies and the picture painted by the administration
for public consumption.

The Soviet Union simply was not

willing or able to fight a major land war in Europe
during this period.

Most intelligence coming into

Washington insisted the Soviets sought to avoid a major
conflict at almost all costs for at least 10 to 15 years
after World War II.20

The State Department and the Moscow

Embassy concurred that the Soviet Union had no intention
of achieving its goals through direct military invasion
of the West.

In fact, after establishing the inferiority

of Russian military strength, the Division of Research
and Intelligence suggested "if a dispute in an existing
area of conflict should definitely threaten war, the USSR
would, during the period of its inferior war potential,
back down before permitting the matter to come to a test
of arms."21

20For a review of such intelligence reports document
ing the relative weakness of the Soviet economy and
military capability see Office of Strategic Studies,"Mem
orandum for the President: Problems and Objectives of
U.S. Policy," May 1945, in Declassified Documents
(Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1981) microfiche # 007622, 2;
U.K. Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, "Soviet Interests,
Intentions, and Capabilities" (London: August 1947), 1-3,
5, 7, Personal xerox copy; Central Intelligence Group,
"Memorandum for the President," Oct. 30 1946 in, Declas
sified Documents (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1982) micro
fiche # 000549.
21Department of State, "The Soviet Internal Situa
tion," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol.
V (Washington: USGPO, 1972), 623-627. Even as late as
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While the administration was not accurately repre
senting the strength and intentions of the Soviet Union
as its experts in the executive branch perceived them, it
was presenting an image that would ensure its foreign
policy goals the greatest chance of success.

This con

sideration lay at the heart of the divergence between the
internal and external justifications for Truman's GreekTurkish policy.
Besides magnifying the Soviet threat and defining it
in military terms, the Truman administration emphasized
the ideological roots of the conflict between the Soviet
Union and the "free world.”

The discussions concerning

economic recovery and political blackmail so central to
the internal justification were either muted or absent in
the external justification.

A number of foreign policy

experts and political insiders noticed the grandiose and
universal language used by the President in his address
to Congress was unlike that used behind closed doors.

194 9 when the Cold War was in full swing the Moscow
Embassy repeatedly reported Russia was in no position to
enter into hostilities with the West. According to
Ambassador Kirk, "while sudden unanticipated Soviet
progress in the atomic field might possibly advance the
date on which they would be prepared to accept or in
itiate hostilities, such date would by no means be 'in
the near future.'" Department of State, "Memo from
Ambassador Kirk to Washington," Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1949, Vol. V (Washington: USGPO, 1972),
658.
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Marshall, Kennan, and Charles Bohlen were well aware of
the internal justifications for the policy and, on the
basis of such rationale, agreed the U.S. should assume
Britain's role in Greece and Turkey.

But while they all

supported the policy, none had the opportunity to par
ticipate in the drafting of the President's speech, which
was produced by the State Department's public relations
office with help from Acheson, Clifford, Jones, the
S.W.N.C.C. and of course Truman.22
Kennan advanced two criticisms of the external
justification offered in Truman's historic speech.
First, Truman's language suggested the criterion used to
determine whether or not the U.S. should offer aid to
Greece and Turkey was "proof of the existence of a threat
'of subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pres
sure.'"

Besides the fact that this was not— and in

Kennan's opinion should not have been— a central factor
in the decision to offer aid in this case, it left open

22Kennan was invited to see the message a day before
the final draft was sent to the White House. By that
time his objections to the "sweeping language" of the
speech were too late since "no one wanted to repeat the
agony of collective drafting." Kennan, 315. Bohlen was
accompanying Marshall to the Foreign Ministers meeting in
Moscow, so neither of them knew the content of the Truman
Doctrine until they received a copy of the speech during
a stopover in Paris.
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the question of whether the United States would give aid
on that novel basis in the future.

Second, Kennan held:

I would also take exception to the repeated
suggestions, in the text of that message, that
what we were concerned to defend in Greece was
the democratic quality of the country's insti
tutions. . . . It was unwise to suggest that
this, too, was an essential criterion.23
The Truman administration knew quite well it was not
coming to the aid of "democratic forces" in Greece and
Turkey but anti-communist and, in the case of Turkey,
anti-Russian forces.

Kennan was less concerned that such

cynical considerations of power politics would be un
palatable to the American public.24

Years later Kennan

observed in Americans a "persistent urge to seek univer
sal formulae or doctrines in which to clothe and justify
particular actions."25
The State Department draft which Kennan criticized
was sent to the White House on the 7th of March.

There,

Clifford and George Elsey were supposed to work it into a
speech.

Upon seeing the draft, Elsey, who was aware of

the internal justification for the aid program, reacted

23Kennan, 321-322.
24A number of observers have documented the reaction
ary nature of the Greek royalist forces in power after
194 6. See Thomas, 384; Feis, 17 6. The Turkish Monarchy
lacked even the veneer of a democratic political system.
25Kennan, 322.
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much as Kennan had.

In a memorandum to Clifford, Elsey

said: "There has been no overt action in the immediate
past by the USSR which serves as an adequate pretext for
such an 'All-out' speech."

Reflecting his grasp of the

subtle arguments which had justified the policy in the
internal realm, Elsey continued, "The situation in Greece
is relatively 'abstract;' there have been other instan
ces— Iran for example— where the occasion more adequately
justified such a speech."26
Bohlen and Marshall were equally alarmed by the tone
of Truman's address.

Upon receiving a copy of the speech

in Paris Bohlen said, "it seemed to General Marshall and
to me that there was a little too much flamboyant anti
communism in the speech."

But upon cabling his reserva

tions back to Washington Marshall "received a reply that
in the considered opinion of the executive branch, in
cluding the President, the Senate would not approve the
doctrine without the emphasis on the Communist danger."27
Little in the internal debates, or the "Washington
consensus" discussed previously, prepared these analysts
and statesmen for the sweeping ideological oratory

26Donovan, 282.
27Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History: 1929-1969,
(W.W. Norton and Company, 1973), 261.
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through which Truman justified the Greek-Turkish aid
program to the American public and Congress.

As far as

the critics of.the external justification were concerned-especially Kennan and Bohlen, who were the resident
experts on the Soviet Union and thus keenly aware of its
weaknesses— the speech was a distortion of reality.

All

the critics of the external justification readily ack
nowledged the need for the United States to play an
active role in the economic and political recovery of
Western Europe and those states on the periphery of the
Soviet sphere of influence.

The potential costs of not

acting forcefully would be the loss of these areas by
default or the Finlandization of them through psychologi
cal and political pressure applied by Moscow.

However,

Acheson, Truman, and his domestic political advisors were
not sure this argument— or similar ones involving global
economic recovery and the continued existence of world
order— would be sufficient to sway a stingy Congress or a
population leery of foreign aid programs.

The internal

arguments smacked of unsavory power politics.

Therefore,

the administration intentionally created a divergence
between internal and external justifications.

The exter

nal audience would -have to be given certain types of
reasons if the policy were to have a good chance of
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success.

In this case the need to satisfy a domestic

political audience conditioned a divergence between the
justifications in the two realms.28
The tone of crisis in Truman's speech was largely
due to the perceived need to gain Congressional support
for his Greek-Turkish policy and, to a lesser extent, for
future aid to Western Europe.

However, Clifford later

recalled an additional reason for the strident rhetoric.
"We wanted to send a signal to Stalin."29

Presumably,

Clifford felt that such a forceful act accompanied by
strong words would restrain future Soviet adventures in
areas where U.S. interests were involved.

While domestic

political impediments to Truman's policy were the primary
cause of a divergence in this case, the consideration
raised by Clifford would prove to be a significant cause
of divergence in a number of historic issue areas, in
cluding t h e .Berlin crises, U.S. entry into the Vietnam
War, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

28For a condensed version of the internal/external
justification for the Greek-Turkish aid policy see table
in Appendix A.
29Donovan, 283.
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The Need to Signal an International Audience
It is not a cliche to suggest the world is becoming
a smaller place.

Since World War II, the global popula

tion has more than doubled; technological advances have
made intercontinental travel a matter of hours rather
than weeks; the entire world is linked by television and
satellite communications; the underdeveloped countries
are desperately seeking education and technological
assets from the industrialized nations; and the West has
become dependent on the third world for its natural
resources.

Because of increased interdependence, the

political, economic and military decisions made by any
state or group of states often have a direct impact on
the welfare of a large number of other countries.

For

this reason, very few state actions go unnoticed by the
international community.

Therefore, political leaders

and advisors must make decisions and justify them with
the knowledge that they have an attentive audience.
Raymond Cohen concludes that since governmental figures
and their policies will be scrutinized, "all outward
directed behavior is the product of careful delibera-
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tion."30

Policies are purposely chosen and justified for

their effect on the attentive audience.

Cohen points out

that since all behavior is considered purposeful in
international relations, observers attach meanings to all
actions and words.
When the United States sent 15,000 troops to Hon
duras for "training exercises" in the Spring of 1988, it
was not simply an attempt to sharpen the military skills
of its armed forces.

For two months preceding the man

euvers the Nicaraguan army had increased its number of
penetrations across the Honduran border in skirmishes
with the contras.

The American training exercises were

intended to show Managua that the U.S. noticed the incur
sions and might take action to prevent them or retaliate
with some other military means.

The Sandinistas correct

ly interpreted the signal and the border violations
decreased.

The geographic proximity and heightened

readiness of a large contingent of American troops served
as a clear warning to the Sandinistas.

Even if the U.S.

had intended no warning and was merely training military
personnel, the Sandinistas would have interpreted the
maneuvers as a signal because of an assumption of inten-

30Raymond Cohen, Theater of Power: The Art of Diplo
matic Signalling (New York: Longman, 1987), 3.
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tionality.31 As discussed previously, all action in
international relations is thought by the audience to be
a deliberate attempt to communicate.

In the context of

Central America in early 1988, policy makers in
Washington must have noticed that the Sandinistas would
interpret the action as a warning.
Those states with the greatest political, military,
and economic strength generally have the greatest in
fluence on a large number of other states.

Therefore,

the big powers will be the most closely watched and thus
have the greatest incentive to cultivate a certain rep
utation.

The United States has been the most closely

watched country since 1945 and American political leaders
have made policy with this fact in mind.
However, the mere existence of an attentive interna
tional audience does not provide an incentive to formu
late policies and justify them in ways that will satisfy
the audience.

American policy makers are concerned with

31According to Cohen "Contemporary observers can
never be absolutely certain of others' real intentions.
Hence they have top assume that actors do indeed intend
the ostensible meanings of their acts. Since all actors
know (or quickly learn) that all public acts, except
those self evidently accidental of inadvertent, may be
considered significant, the assumption tends to become a
self-fulfilling prophecy." Furthermore "the assumption
of intentionality is observed to be a working convention
among diplomats and national security officers." Ibid,
20 .
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the perceptions of the international audience (and shape
their justifications accordingly) because those percep
tions affect the ability of the United States to achieve
its goals and pursue its interests.

Others' perceptions

of a nation matter and should be included in any attempt
to measure a state's influence or power.

Reputation as a Factor of State Power
The realist school of thought in international
relations focusses on power as the most important element
determining interstate relations.

The assumption of the

primacy of power has been the focus of much debate in the
field; unfortunately, the debate has been overshadowed by
a persistence among both critics and advocates of the
realist tradition to view power as a quantifiable asset
based primarily on economic and military strength.32

32While a number of realists assert general defini
tions of power which could account for a broad spectrum
of variables, once put into practice material components
of power are often represented out of all proportion to
their actual significance in determining events. Paul
Kennedy pays lip service to "cultural variables" and
"international reputation" but when it comes to applying
theory, power for Kennedy is determined by a state's
economic base, military strength, geographic size and
location, and population. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and
Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987),
See also Bernstein's analysis of Walter Lippmann's
material understanding of "balance of power considera
tions." Bernstein, 47.
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Perhaps because these components of state power are the
most easily measured and compared, analysts on both sides
of the debate assume they are the most important elements
in any power equation.
A crude critique of realism became popular after
America's failure in Vietnam.

Realism's critics claimed

that a focus on power relations failed to predict and
still fails to explain the American defeat in Vietnam.
The critics correctly claim the United States possessed
many times the economic, military, and geopolitical power
of North Vietnam.

Therefore, concludes the argument, any

analysis employing power relations as the singular ex
planatory force in interstate affairs would fail to
predict the outcome which is now history.

Such explana

tions fail to grasp the subtlety of power relations in
interstate affairs.

An examination of the power rela

tions operating during the Vietnam War would be remiss
were it not to define the limits within which each state
could wield its power.

The United States faced signifi

cant military and political constraints on its power,
some self-imposed and some imposed by states other than
North Vietnam.33

33The Johnson administration was constrained by the
expected negative reaction of the American people to an
all-out war in Vietnam. More significantly, the admin
istration felt itself restrained by the Soviet Union and
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Another factor that must be included in any discus
sion of power is the role a state's reputation plays in
shaping international expectations and attitudes.

A

state's ability to operate effectively and achieve its
goals in an interdependent world is intimately linked to
the perceptions that others have of the state.

Decision

makers act on the assumption that the long-term effects
of an action may aid or hinder that state in its future
relations with other states.

According to Robert Keohane

"a good reputation is like a capital asset:

it will make

it easier to enter future international agreements, at
lower costs."34 A traditional realist, Hans Morganthau,
states the problem in the negative sense when he claims
that nations which fail to observe treaties may exper
ience a net loss "in the long run, since a nation that
has the reputation for reneging on its commercial obliga-

communist China, whose potential presence in Vietnam
negated the possibility of an invasion of the North. Any
direct confrontation between the U.S. and either China or
the Soviet Union was ruled out as potentially too costly.
This consideration undoubtedly contributed to the outcome
of the war'.
34Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and
Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Prin
ceton University Press, 1984), 105-106.
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tions will find it hard to conclude commercial treaties
beneficial to itself."35
While both Keohane and Morganthau are discussing
questions of international trade, the same dynamic is at
work in the security realm.

States seek to establish

certain reputations not as ends in themselves, but be
cause they are instrumentally useful for the state pursu
ing its interests.

Accordingly, nations do not act as

crude act utilitarians.

There may be instances where

some policy will bring short-term gains, but in the long
run, the costs of that action will outweigh whatever
gains are made in the isolated instance.

As long as

political leaders and other policy makers act as if they
believe their actions have long-term consequences on the
status— and therefore the ability to achieve goals— of
their state, they may not act to maximize immediate
utility at the expense of reputation.
There appears to be a widely held belief among
policy makers that the stakes in any conflictual inter
state relationship are often much more subtle than a
material balance of power model might suggest.

Robert

Tucker claims "specific conflicts of interest will be

35Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations, fourth
edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948/1967), 283.
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invested with a significance they would not otherwise
have."36 Quite simply, situations arise where states
devote lives, resources, and energy out of all proportion
to the immediate material gains that could be achieved
through such actions.

In 1961 the Soviet Union chal

lenged the American position in West Berlin.

While the

city added little to the West economically and was an
indefensible military liability 100 miles inside the
German Democratic Republic, the United States risked
global war and significant political capital in defense
of the American position in West Berlin.

According to

President Kennedy, West Berlin had
become, as never before, the great testing
place of Western courage and will, a focal
point where our solemn commitments. . . and
Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confronta
tion. . . If we do not meet our commitments in
Berlin, where will we later stand?37
In the Cuban missile crisis, which came one year later,
policy makers in Washington were as concerned about the
international reputation of the U.S. as much as they were
about gaining or losing a strategic advantage.

During

the policy debates of October 1961 Kennedy down played

36Robert Osgood and Robert Tucker, Force, Order, and
Justice (Balt:Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 201.
37Ibid.
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the military significance of the missiles in Cuba, "it
doesn't make any difference if you get blown up by an
ICBM flying from the Soviet Union or one that was ninety
miles away."38 When Presidential Counsel Ted Sorensen
summed up the views of Ex Comm after the first two days
of deliberations he wrote:
It is generally agreed that these missiles,
even when fully operational, do not signif
icantly alter the balance of power. . . Never
theless it is generally agreed that the United
States cannot tolerate the known presence of
offensive nuclear weapons in a country ninety
miles from our shore, if our courage and com
mitments are ever to be believed by either
allies or adversaries.39
Had the United States backed down in Berlin or al
lowed Soviet missiles to be publicly deployed in Cuba,
the administration believed the U.S. would have suffered
a grave blow to its reputation as a great power and cer
tainly would have lost influence with both its allies and
its adversaries in future crises.

The allies, it was

argued, would lose confidence in American commitments and

38Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time
(N.Y.: the Free Press, 1986), 9.
39Ibid, 9. The policy to "quarantine" Cuba brought
the U.S. and the Soviet Union as close to war as they
have been in the 40' years since 1945. Interestingly, the
external justification for that policy stressed the
military threat posed by the missiles in Cuba. The
internal justification expressed the concerns of an ego
contest.
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its adversaries might view the U.S. as a paper tiger that
could be intimidated.

An apparent loss of power would

bring more challenges and increase the likelihood of
future crises.

It would not matter that the actual mil

itary and economic capabilities of the United States were
still preeminent and largely unchanged; America would
have lost influence in the world.
Only war offers a final accounting of state power.
The outcome of any confrontation short of war will be
determined by the perceptions that actors have of each
other.

If country X and Country Y believe Y is more

powerful than X, then Country Y is in practice more pow
erful.

Naturally, the material capabilities of Y will go

some way in determining both countries' perceptions of
Y's power, but the politically relevant factor is the
belief— whether well fpunded or not-— that Y is stronger.
Perceptions and reputations have become increasingly
important in determining events in international affairs
over the past 40 years.

Besides the obvious technologi

cal improvements in communication, the strategic nuclear
arsenals of the great powers have made all-out global war
unthinkable.

Since state power can no longer be deter

mined through war, the subjective understanding of ana
lysts and political leaders will determine actions and

67
reactions in interstate affairs.

Policy makers can no

longer resort to a final accounting of power relations by
choosing to go to war.

The improbability of war has

emphasized the importance of a state's reputation in
determining its ability to achieve its objectives.
Therefore, political leaders in the United States have
gone to great lengths to protect or bolster the state's
reputation.

The case study in Chapter Three illustrates

this point better than any theoretical discussion of the
concern for reputation maintenance in determining a
state's foreign policy.

The consideration of the state's

reputation helps to explain the perceived U.S. interest,
eventual entry, and the difficulty of withdrawal from the
Vietnam War.
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CHAPTER III; TYPES OF DIVERGENCE
A divergence between internal and external justifi
cations may be caused by a number of different factors
and may appear in a variety of forms.

Examination of

particular cases reveals the various ways in which diver
gence can manifest itself.

Until now, "divergence” has

been used to describe instances where the content of the
internal and external justifications was not the same.
Truman and his advisors said one thing behind closed
doors and something entirely different to the public and
Congress.

This type of divergence is the easiest to

identify and will be called a "simple" divergence.
Another type of divergence is evident in cases where the
same justifications are given in the internal and exter
nal realms, but the emphasis on particular reasons for
the policy is different in the two forums.

This type of

qualitative divergence existed at the time the U.S.
government decided to deploy ground combat forces in
Vietnam.

In this case little or nothing was being with

held from the external audiences; instead, the same
material was being presented in a different way.1

1This study is concerned with similarities or dif
ferences in justificatory arguments; therefore, when it
is said that nothing was being withheld from the public
this does not refer to the inaccurate reporting of body
counts or "successful" pacification efforts. The Johnson
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Vietnam: A "Divergence of Order"
As illustrated in Chapter One, the set of reasons
which comprise a justification can be hierarchically
ranked in order of importance.

When the order of par

ticular reasons for a policy is obviously different in
the internal and external realms, there exists a "dive
rgence of order."

This type of divergence is evident in

the Johnson administration's policy toward Vietnam in
1964-1965.

The internal justification for deployment of

ground combat troops focused on the position of the
United States as a superpower in the world.

However,

while the external justification contained the considera
tions which drove the internal debate, it stressed the
American obligation to preserve the right of the people
of the Republic of Vietnam to remain "independent and
free from communist tyranny."

This discussion of the

internal and external justifications for the U.S. policy
to commit combat troops demonstrates how a divergence can

administration did confront a "credibility gap" due to
its rosy predictions which seemed to contradict televised
reports of the war, especially after the Tet offensive in
1968. However, the arguments which the administration
used as rationale for its entry into the war were roughly
the same in the internal and external realms.
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exist while the content of the justifications in both
realms is roughly the same.2
By 1964 the position of the American backed regime
in Saigon had reached a critical stage.

After the assas

sination of Diem, a series of inefficient military juntas
and dictatorial governments failed to put down the Na
tional Liberation Front (N.L.F.) insurgency or effective
ly address the underlying political problems facing the
country.

In an attempt to bolster the confidence of its

allies in the South, the United States embarked on a
bombing campaign that was ostensibly started in response
to North Vietnamese attacks on U.S. warships.3 However,
at the behest of McGeorge Bundy, Assistant Secretary of
Defense John McNaughton, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(J.C.S.), the "tit for tat" bombing raids soon became a
program of gradually intensified "sustained reprisals"

2While official pronouncements on U.S. policy in
Vietnam contained virtually all the accepted arguments
presented behind closed doors, (the internal justifica
tion) the reverse was not true. Many internal discus
sions and memorandums made no reference to moral and
ideological arguments which were a staple of the external
justification.
3For a discussion of the alleged attacks on the
U.S.S. Maddox and Turner Joy in the Tonkin Gulf which
preceded U.S. reprisals see George C. Herring, America's
Longest War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 116-129.
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against targets in the North.4 The bombing raids, while
highly destructive, did little to improve the political
situation in South Vietnam.

When it appeared the Saigon

regime might not survive without direct American military
intervention, American policy makers initiated what was
until then the most intense internal policy debate on
American strategy and objectives in South East Asia.

Internal Justification: Supremacy of National Credibility
After the decision to deploy two battalions of U.S.
Marines to protect the airbase at DaNang in early 1965, a
series of increasing pressures pushed President Johnson
toward the decision to commit significant numbers of
American troops to the war effort.

At first General

William Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs were the prin
cipal advocates of intervention; however, between Feb
ruary and July of 1965, almost all the President's lead
ing advisors advocated direct U.S. entry into the land
war.

Even Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, who initially

advocated a compromise "enclave strategy," soon fell in

4Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives
of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: Holt Rinehart and
Winston, 1971), 127-128.
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line.5 Only Undersecretary of State George Ball and
Johnson's personal advisor, Clark Clifford, insisted a
commitment of troops would be a mistake.

Ball expressed

concern that the adoption of Westmoreland's proposals,
which called for the introduction of 150,000 American
troops, would lead to a "protracted war involving an
open-ended commitment of U.S. forces, mounting U.S.
casualties, no assurances of a satisfactory solution, and
a serious danger of escalation."

He concluded that after

such a large and visible commitment to the continued
existence of South Vietnam, "Our involvement will be so
great that we cannot— without national humiliation— stop
short of achieving our complete objectives."6

In pre

senting his objections to a troop deployment, Ball vocal-

5Taylor's enclave strategy effectively left the land
war to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (A.R.V.N.),
while the U.S. troops stayed within a 50 mile radius of
the airfields and strategic positions they were assigned
to protect. This cautious approach was abandoned in mid1965 after a fact finding mission led Defense Secretary
Robert McNamara to agree with Westmoreland that U.S.
forces should "take the war to the enemy." For details
see Bruce Palmer's, The 25 Year War (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1984), 41-42.
6"Ball to Johnson," July 1, 1965, Pentagon Papers,
Sheehan ed. (New York: New York Times Publishing, 1972),
449-454.
In a more poetic moment, Ball restated his
concerns, "Once on the tiger's back, we cannot be sure of
picking the place to dismount." George W. Ball, The Past
Has Another Pattern (New York: W.W. Norton and Company,
1982), 380.
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ized the crucial consideration on which the issue would
be decided— namely, the effect of deployment or with
drawal on the validity of U.S. commitments around the
world.
Most of the participants involved in the policy
debates of 1964-1965 agreed with Ball that the United
States should be fundamentally concerned with maintaining
a certain image and avoiding national humiliation.
Damage to U.S. credibility was the crucial cost to be
managed.7 The reputation of the United States as a reso
lute adversary and a loyal ally was viewed as the founda
tion for world order.8

If the U.S. decided to commit

ground forces it would be serving notice that the stakes
in Vietnam were paramount.

Therefore, as America became

more directly involved, the importance of Vietnam grew
out of all proportion to its physical and strategic

7Unlike most contemporary critics of the war, Ball
(and his colleagues) was less concerned that American
lives, property, and strategic assets and moral virtue
would be lost in Vietnam than he was that U.S. prestige
would be damaged— and hence America's position as a
superpower in the world.
8The "central lesson of our time" was learned at
Munich according to Johnson. Appeasement of aggressive
states was viewed as an invitation to more aggression and
a major impediment to world order. Kathleen J. Turner,
Lyndon Johnson's Dual War: Vietnam and the Press.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 3, 23-24,
51-53.
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position in the world.

Washington focused on the United

States perceptions of itself and more importantly, on the
international community's perceptions of U.S. actions.
While Vietnam had little strategic, economic, or
even cultural value to the United States, Johnson and his
advisors were convinced that allowing the Saigon regime
to fall would weaken American influence and encourage
disorder throughout the world.9 If the United States
pulled out of Vietnam in 1965, Johnson warned, "it might
as well give up everywhere else— pull out of Berlin,
Japan, South America."10

The overriding concern was not

the loss of Vietnam itself, but the effect a successful
revolution might have on world order.

The United States,

as the economic and political giant of the free world had
a clear interest in maintaining global stability so it
could normalize relations with the Soviet Union and
continue to lead the expansion of the world market.

If

any state had a stake in the institutionalization of the
status quo it was the United States.

The long-range

9In describing U.S. interests and objectives in
Vietnam Palmer claims "South Vietnam was not vital to the
United States." However by 1965 "our credibility world
wide" became "an important U.S. interest." Vietnam would
test American credibility. Palmer, 28.
10Herring, 141. The administration felt that the way
it responded to "communist provocations" in Vietnam would
have "profound consequences everywhere." Ibid., 115.

75
intelligence estimates coming into Washington during
1964-1965 warned "revolution and disorder" had become
"epidemic" within the developing countries.

The C.I.A.

believed there was a greater chance the superpowers would
be drawn, possibly against their will, into direct con
frontation if such third world conflicts continued un
checked.11
The American Cold War obsession with containing
communism and preventing the spread of revolutionary
movements was conditioned by a U.S. consensus originally
elaborated in NSC-68 and strengthened by the American
experience in Korea.

In the case of Vietnam the long

term consensus became codified— and American policy
implicitly sanctioned by the bi-partisan foreign policy
establishment— when Johnson in July 1965 consulted a
panel of "wise m^n."

The group consisted largely of

former statesmen, advisors, and military men whose task
was to consider the U.S. position in Vietnam and make
recommendations directly to the President.

One of the

questions the panel was asked to address was: "To what

11C.I.A., "Trends In the World Situation," June 9,
1964, Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog, micro
fiche 00075, 251A.
It was assumed that a U.S. withdrawal
from Vietnam would threaten global stability by giving a
green light to every would be nationalist revolutionary
in the developing world.
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extent would a communist takeover in South Vietnam, in
the face of the U.S. commitment, affect U.S. credibility
and standing in holding on to key areas such as Northeast
Asia, the Philippines, India, and even Europe?"

William

Bundy describes the panel's response as "clear and unmis
takable."

The wise men agreed with the administration

that the stakes were "very high indeed."

If the regime

in Saigon was not bolstered, "deGaulle would then find
many takers for his argument that the U.S. could not be
counted on to defend Europe."

The panel also agreed

"that Vietnam was a test case for 'wars of national
liberation' and that a U.S. defeat would lead to wide
spread questioning whether U.S. commitments could be
relied on."

According to Bundy, "The panel thought that

standing firm in Vietnam was of very great importance to
American interests and to the independence of many na
tions and areas."12
Every President from Truman to Johnson had made
repeated public statements in support of the non-com
munist political forces in Vietnam which, after the
Geneva Accords of 1954, were located exclusively below
the 17th parallel.

Eisenhower and Dulles legally com-

12George Kahin, Intervention: How America Became
Involved In Vietnam (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1986), 360361.
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mitted the U.S. to the defense of South Vietnam through
the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

Kennedy

increased military and economic aid to the Saigon regime.
Shortly after taking over from Kennedy in November 1963,
Johnson assured Congress that America would uphold its
commitments "from South Vietnam to West Berlin."13

The

consensus within the administration held that the reputa
tion of the United States rested on the fulfillment of
these promises.14

The administration considered the costs

of abandoning South Vietnam— measured in terms of damage

13Kathleen J. Turner, Lyndon Johnson's Dual War:
Vietnam and the Press (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1985), 53-54. As early as May 1961 Johnson's
concern with Vietnam rested on a belief that the percep
tion other states held of the U.S. was a fundamental
factor in determining American power and influence. Upon
return from a trip to South East Asia, then Vice Presi
dent Johnson reported to President Kennedy, "The alterna
tive to aiding the countries of that region was to throw
in the towel...and pull our defenses back to San Francis
co. . . . (W)e would say to the world. . .that we don't
live up to treaties and don't stand by our friends."
"Johnson to Kennedy," May 23, 1961, Pentagon Papers,
Vol.II, Gravel Edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), 5859.
14A11 the leading members of the administration were
heavily conditioned by the "lessons of World War II." In
a meeting of the N.S.C. General Wheeler insisted the cost
of appeasement would be a wider war.
"If we walk out of
this one, we will just have to face others." At the same
meeting former ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam,
Henry Cabot Lodge, invoked the analogy viewed with almost
religious reverence by official Washington. He argued
there was an increased chance of global war "if we don't
go in. Can't we see the similarity to our own indolence
at Munich." Kahin, 37 8.
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to its reputation— as greater than the costs of going to
war.
Johnson and his advisors were quite specific in
their concerns about how U.S. influence— and as a result
its material interests— would be adversely affected by a
failure to commit troops in Vietnam.

The explicit U.S.

promise to ensure the independence of South Vietnam was
thought to focus world attention on the credibility of
the strongest nation in the world.

America's adversaries

in Moscow, Peking, and numerous nationalist movements
would supposedly interpret the U.S. response in Vietnam
as a deliberate signal.

The majority view assumed

American allies would be reassured and her adversaries
would be more cautious if the U.S. stood firm.

Given the

steadily worsening situation in the South, this meant
sending combat troops.
McGeorge Bundy stressed the importance of increasing
U.S. forces in Vietnam as it related to "boosting the
morale" of anti-communist forces in the South.

General

Earl Wheeler agreed, stating, "our additional forces will
stave off a deteriorating situation."

Admiral David

McDonald argued against the critics of intervention,
insisting "our allies will lose faith in us" if we do not
"pour in more men."

He was most concerned with the
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policy's beneficial effects on other countries in South
East Asia such as Thailand, Burma, and the Philippines.15
More often participants argued America's adversaries
would be emboldened by a U.S. withdrawal.

In a meeting

at the White House in July, 1965, Secretary of State Dean
Rusk insisted, "It is more important to convince the
communist leadership of this (that the U.S. would honor
its commitments through military intervention) than to
worry about the opinion of non-communist countries."
McNamara agreed with Rusk when the Secretary of State
said, "If the communist world finds out we will not
pursue our commitments to the end, I don't know where
they will stay there hand."16

While some of the mili

tary participants in the policy debates mentioned the
need to win the war in Vietnam, it is clear that some
within the administration felt all that was needed to
achieve the goal of reputation maintenance was a visible
effort.

All the principals thought a military victory

was desirable, but some, notably McNaughton and McNamara
from the Defense Department, did not view it as necessary
to achieve the primary internal objective.

In a memo to

the President on July 20, 1965, McNamara argued for a

15Kahin, 310, 380-381.
16Ibid., 377.
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’’prompt and substantial" increase in the number of
American troops operating in South Vietnam and claimed
his recommendation would "offer a good chance of produc
ing a favorable settlement in the longer run; at the same
time it would imply a commitment to see a fighting war
clear through at considerable cost and casualties and
material.’*17 McNamara's argument rested on the assumption
that to fight a war and incur all the concomitant costs
was itself the strongest signal a nation could send to
bolster the credibility of its spoken word.

By Herring's

account, "Even if the United States could not hold South
Vietnam, Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton
argued, it would appear stronger to allies and adver
saries alike if it 'kept slugging away' rather than
meekly accepting defeat.’’18

In this view the outcome of

the war was of secondary importance; what was needed to
signal the world that the United States would keep its
promises was a huge effort and the loss of American
lives.
Ball, the administration's principal critic, never
disagreed with what the establishment claimed was at
stake in Vietnam: America's reputation as a resolute

17Ibid., 363.
laHerring, 128-129.
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world power.

He simply felt that the risks of losing a

war to a group of guerrillas was potentially more damag
ing to America's reputation than reneging on a commitment
to save a government that lacked legitimacy in the eyes
of its own people and that would surely fall without U.S.
help.

Unlike subsequent critics, Ball did not oppose the

troop deployments

(or the war in general) on moral

grounds, but with respect to minimizing the damage to
U.S. national interests— which were intimately linked
with the image other states held of America.
The following is a selected account of the discus
sions which took place in the White House in late July
1965 as recalled by President Johnson's aid Jack Valenti.
Ball was clearly in agreement with the ends to be
achieved— or avoided— in Vietnam, even though his policy
recommendation differed from the consensus.
Secretary McNamara had recently proposed the deploy
ment of 100,000 troops and most of the principals in the
discussion supported the plan.

Johnson was still search

ing for alternatives and Ball was acknowledged as the
official devil's advocate.
President: But,
in the national
better than the
it is dangerous
tion is, can it

George, is there another course
interest, some course that is
one McNamara proposes? We know
and perilous, but the big ques
be avoided?
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Ball: If we get bogged down, our cost might be
substantially greater. The pressures to create
a larger war would be irresistible. The quali
fications I have are not due to the fact that I
think we are in a bad moral position.
President: Tell me then, what other road can I
go?
Ball: Take what precautions we can, Mr. Presi
dent. Take our losses, let their government
fall apart, negotiate, discuss, knowing full
well there will be a probable take-over by the
Communists.
President: . . . Are you able to outline your
doubts? Can you offer another course of ac
tion? I think it's desirable to hear you out,
truly hear you out, then I can determine if
your suggestions are sound and ready to be
followed, which I am prepared to do if I am
convinced.
Ball: Yes, Mr. President.
I think I can pre
sent to you the least bad of two courses. What
I would present is a course that is costly, but
can be limited to short-term costs. . . . I am
concerned about world opinion.
If we could win
in a year's time, and win decisively, world
opinion would be alright. However, if the war
is long and protracted, as I believe it will
be, then we will suffer because the world's
greatest power cannot defeat guerrillas. . . .
I think a long, protracted war will disclose
our weakness, not our strength.
(Ball goes on
to explain his concerns as they relate to the
perceptions of U.S. allies in Taiwan, South
Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Japan.)
President: But George, wouldn't all these coun
tries say that Uncle Sam was a paper tiger,
wouldn't we lose credibility breaking the word
of three presidents, if we did as you have
proposed? It would seem to be an irreparable
blow. But I gather you don't think so.
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Ball: No, sir. The worse blow would be that
the mightiest power on earth is unable to de
feat a handful of guerrillas.
President: Then you are not basically troubled
by what the world would say about our pulling
out?
Ball: If we were actively helping a country
with a stable viable government, it would be a
vastly different story. Western Europeans look
upon us as if we got ourselves into an impru
dent situation.19
While Ball criticized the policy recommendations of
the majority, he did not disagree with the justification
for the policy.

As the record shows, Ball was in com

plete agreement with the expressed purpose of the policy.
The most parsimonious articulation of the internal
rationale that guided debate on the administration's
Vietnam policy is found in a March 1965 memorandum from
McNaughton to McNamara.

There McNaughton weighted U.S.

objectives in Vietnam as: "70% to preserve our national
honor as a guarantor (and the reciprocal: to avoid a
show-case success for Communist 'wars of liberation'),
20% to keep SVN (and their adjacent) territory free from
hostile expansive hands, 10% To permit the people of SVN
to enjoy a better, freer way of life."

McNaughton's list

of U.S. objectives is reflected in the official record

19Jack Valenti, A Very Human President
W. Norton and Company, 1975), 328-335.

(New York: W.
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where, as discussed previously, the overriding concern
among all the principals was the reputation of the United
States.

In the conclusion of the same memo, McNaughton

echoed the concerns that were the focus of the policy
debate in the internal realm.
It is essential— however badly SEA (Southeast
Asia) may go over the next 1-3 years— that the
U.S. emerge as a "good doctor." We must have
kept promises, been tough, taken risks, gotten
bloodied and hurt the enemy very badly. We
must avoid harmful appearances which will af
fect judgments by, and provide pretexts to,
other nations regarding how the U.S. will be
have in future cases of particular interest to
those nations— regarding U.S. policy, power,
resolve and competence to deal with their prob
lems .20

External Justification: Moral and Legal Preeminence
The emphasis on reputation maintenance in the inter
nal realm lies in stark contrast to the alleged impor
tance of various reasons given for the administration's
policy in the external realm.

In fact, the order in

which particular reasons for the Vietnam policy were
presented in public pronouncements were often reversed
from their positions in the internal justification.
While McNaughton stressed America's future credibility as
70% responsible for the need to pursue a policy of inter

20As cited in Kahin, 313, 357.
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vention, policy statements from 1964 to 1966 painted
quite a different picture.

In March 1964 McNamara ex

plained U.S. objectives and interests to the public in
reverse order to those later elaborated by "the person on
whom McNamara depended most in developing his approach to
Vietnam," John McNaughton.21 According to the Secretary
of Defense:
The U.S. role in South Vietnam, then, is first,
and most importantly, to answer the call of the
South Vietnamese, a member nation of our freeworld family, to help them save their country
for themselves; second, to help prevent the
strategic danger which would exist if communism
absorbed Southeast Asia's people and resources;
and third, to prove in the Vietnamese test case
that the free-world can cope with communist
'wars of liberation' as we have coped success
fully with communist aggression at other
levels .22
Johnson's most famous public address on the conflict
in Vietnam came on April 7, 1965, and has since become
known as "The Johns Hopkins Speech."

Many analysts have

correctly pointed out that the internal justification for
the administration's policy was extensively elaborated
here in the external realm.

Using language and logic

21Ibid., 356.
22In the original, the words "first., second, and
third" were italicized. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of
Defense, "United States Policy In Vietnam," for text of
speech see Pentagon Papers, Vol.Ill, Gravel Edition
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), 712-715.
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reminiscent of McNamara's memos, the President informed
60 million American television viewers that world order
depended on the credibility of the American commitment to
South Vietnam.

However, while the external justification

incorporated the substance of arguments made behind
closed doors at the White House, these considerations
were subordinated to moral reasons for the policy.23

The

first quarter of Johnson's speech contained themes such
as "the principles for which our ancestors fought,"
"peace" and the "unparalleled brutality" of the war
started and perpetuated by "aggression from the North."

23"Text of the President's Address on U.S. Policy in
Vietnam," New York Times, April 8 1965, 16. For
Johnson's discussion of the importance of Vietnam as a
place where America must prove the value of its promises
to allies and adversaries see paragraphs 17-18, 21-31,
34. This explanation was not restricted to the Presi
dent's speech.
In an interview on August 9 1965 Secre
tary of State Rusk discussed publicly what was at that
time the central internal justification for escalation.
"The fact is that we know we have a commitment. The
South Vietnamese know we have a commitment. The Com
munist world knows we have a commitment. The rest of the
world knows it. Now, this means that the integrity of
the American commitment is at the heart of the problem.
I believe that the integrity of the American commitment
is the principal structure of peace throughout the world.
Now, if our allies or, more particularly, if our adver
saries should discover that the American commitment is
not worth anything, then the world would face dangers of
which we have not yet dreamed. And so it is important
for us to make good" on that American commitment to South
Viet-Nam." Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Political and
Military Aspects of U.S. Policy in Vietnam," Pentagon
Papers, Vol.IV, Gravel Edition (Boston: Beacon Press,
1972), 636.
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In the sixteenth paragraph Johnson asks, "Why are we in
South Vietnam?”

He then answers: "We are there because

we have a promise to keep.

Since 1954 every American

President has offered support to the people of South
Vietnam."

However, before any mention of the prudential

costs of not keeping promises— the subject which dominat
ed discussions in the internal realm— Johnson posited the
Kantian imperative that "to dishonor that pledge, to
abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and
to the terror that must follow would be an unforgivable
wrong."

Immediately following this moral argument for

escalation, Johnson gave the secondary argument, which in
the internal realm was preeminent.
strengthen world order.

"We are also there to

Around the globe, from Berlin to

Thailand, are people whose well-being rests in part on
the belief that they can count on us if they are at
tacked .1,24

24Johnson, "Text of Address." (emphasis added) The
divergence between internal and external justifications
in this case appears to be less than in some of theother
cases we have looked at. Because of the subtle and
qualitative nature of this "divergence of order" one
might assume there was no divergence.
In this case the
illusion is perpetuated by analysts who comment and
record with only limited information. A demonstration of
the fact that analysts often neglect the first quarter of
Johnson's speech is evidenced by the fact that in most
accounts only the "domino theory" and passages about "the
appetite of aggression is never satisfied" get signifi
cant attention.
The editors of the Pentagon Papers
deleted the first 12 paragraphs of Johnson's speech.
See

88
Following the President's speech, leading admini
stration policy-makers made specific reference to the
order of reasons for U.S. intervention.

Inevitably

government spokesmen emphasized legal and moral commit
ments in the external realm and only referred to credibi
lity or world order as they related to "secondary objec
tives” of U.S. policy.25

The administration structured

its external justification in a manner designed to in
fluence specific audiences.
The administration's concern with the reaction of
states in the international community to U.S. policy in
Vietnam is reflected more in the actions chosen by the
United States— since actions would be understood as
specific signals— rather than in the justification that
accompanied those actions.

However, there were instances

where U.S. actions were supplemented with statements
specifically designed to encourage support for the United

"Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia," Pentagon Papers,
Vol.Ill, Gravel Edition, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972),
730-731.
“ Specific citations of the administration's inverted
priorities can be found in most official statements from
1964-1966.
See Department of State Bulletin form the
period. For edited versions of major public pronounce
ments by principals other than the President and the
Secretary of State see the Pentagon Papers, Vol.Ill, 707743 and Vol.IV, 626-682 in sections entitled "Justific
ation of the War— Public Statements."
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States in the international community.

In an attempt to

dispel charges alleging the U.S. was unwilling to negoti
ate a peace settlement, Johnson halted the air raids on
the north in the much publicized "bombing pause."

The

pause was accompanied by a series of points which out
lined an American negotiating position.

A number of

analysts as well as participants have suggested that the
public statements provided by the administration did not
accurately represent the intentions of the U.S. govern
ment, but were designed to disarm international critics
before the planned escalation of the air war against the
North. In a memorandum to President Johnson, McNamara
suggested the United States should publicly call for
negotiations in order "to cement the support for U.S.
policy by the U.S. public, allies and friends, and to
keep international opposition to a manageable level."
McNamara recognized the initiatives would be rebuffed by
North Vietnam but argued "they nevertheless should be
made."

This would put the U.S. in a more favorable

position when hostilities resumed.26

26A s cited in Kahin, 329-331, 355-356. For a discus
sion of the international propaganda motives behind the
administration's external justification see Herring, 134135; and Valenti, 221-227.
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The American public was an important audience for
the Johnson administration and, to some degree, the need
for support among the American people conditioned the
divergence of order.

As suggested in Chapter One, exter

nal justifications tend to stress moral, ideological, and
legal reasons for policy rather than reasons of national
interest.

By invoking these types of arguments it was

thought the general public would be more likely to sup
port the policies of the administration.

The external

justification did explain policy to a great degree using
moral and ideological themes.

These justifications

became increasingly unacceptable to the American public
as the war progressed.

Television coverage of the "moral

crusade" praised by the administration left many
Americans doubting whether the war was not immoral.
Johnson launched a public relations campaign to gain
support for his policies.

In fact, in just four and a

half years the President himself addressed the United
States public over 200 times on the subject of Vietnam.27
However, while the external justification was meant to
lend legitimacy to and gain public support for U.S.
policy, the length of the war and the extensive media
coverage it received eroded widespread public support.

27Turner, 1.
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Another factor conditioning a divergence of order
was an accurate belief that the average man could not be
emotionally moved by esoteric theories of deterrence or
diatribes about the importance of perceptions in interna
tional politics.

Because of this belief, the primary

internal arguments became "secondary considerations" in
the external realm.

While some critics attacked the

intellectual presuppositions of the domino effect, most
people were simply unmoved by the ethereal arguments of
cause and effect.28

Just months before the fateful de

cision of July 1965 which put the U.S. on an irreversible
course, Vice President Hubert Humphrey warned Johnson,
"American wars have to be politically understandable by
the American public.

There has to be a cogent, convinc

ing case if we are to enjoy sustained public support."29

28According to Raymond Cohen, "The language of geo
politics makes little sense to the general public.
Abstractions have to be given concrete form so that they
can be grasped and related to. . . . For the professional
there is 'nothing personal' in it all. they are simply
acting, as duty obliges them to, as fiduciary agents of
the state, just as a lawyer acts dispassionately in the
best interests of his client. But for the public there
has to be something personal in the carnage and the
suffering. Only by personalizing it all, therefore, can
the community affect the perceptions and actions of its
members in the directions its interest require." Raymond
Cohen, Theater of Power (New York: Longman, 1987), 26.
29Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in
Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York:
The Free Press, 1986), 87.
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Humphrey understood the importance of a comprehensible
and acceptable external justification in a country like
the United States.

In World War II the American people

perceived the United States as rescuing the free world
from an evil aggressor.

Moreover, deep cultural, his

torical and economic ties existed between Western Europe
and the United States and there was an unambiguous enemy
in Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.

The Vietnam conflict

and the justifications for American policy were much more
subtle than in 1942.

Vietnam was not a "war to end all

wars."30 After the moral and legal justifications had been
questioned, the administration lacked a clear and easily
understandable justification for its policies.

The

secondary considerations expressed in the external jus
tification could not motivate Americans to make the
sacrifices they did in 1942-1945 when things seemed much
clearer.31

30Turner suggests that the lack of a comprehensible
and acceptable justification for America's involvement in
Vietnam led to a decrease in public support. According
to Turner, the Tet offensive of 1968 exposed the admini
stration to questions that were not answered in a manner
that could sustain the support of the public. Turner,
234-238.
31George Kennan views with distaste the American
penchant "to attribute a universal significance to de
cisions we have already found it necessary, for limited
and parochial reasons, to take.
It was not enough for
us, when circumstances forced us into World War I, to
hold in view the specific reasons for our entry: our war
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effort had to be clothed in the form of an effort to make
the world (nothing less) 'safe for democracy.'
It was
not enough for us, in World War II , that the Japanese
attacked us at Pearl Harbor and that both Japanese and
German governments declared war on us: we did not feel
comfortable until we had wrapped our military effort in
the wholly universalistic— and largely meaningless—
generalities of the Atlantic Charter." Kennan, 322-323.
For a condensed version of the internal and external
justifications of the decision to commit ground combat
troops in Vietnam, see table in Appendix B.
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CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION
The examination of the Greek-Turkish question and
the U.S. entry into Vietnam have hopefully clarified the
internal-external paradigm and elaborated the role of
justification in the policy process.

A brief summary of

the categories used in this model and some of their
implications for future research is in order.
In the foreign policy process justifications often
change as the audience changes.

External justifications

are usually directed toward the press, the public, and
specific segments of the international community; for
this reason, they frequently contain moral, legal and
ideological arguments to a greater extent than internal
justifications.

Internal justifications are harder to

pinpoint because of the ambiguity of their form and their
inaccessibility in the public domain.

Observers of

international relations are likely to disagree on what
elements of the policy debate comprise the internal
justification and which are the most significant in
shaping the policy.

Internal justifications frequently

stress arguments based on the "national interest," employ
subtle definitions of power, and are presented in an
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arcane language that is incomprehensible to a wider
audience.l
This examination of justification offered detailed
examination of two causes of divergence.

First, the

Greek-Turkish aid policy demonstrated a divergence condi
tioned by a need to gain domestic political support for
the Truman administration's foreign policy.

Second, the

Vietnam policy of the Johnson administration demonstrated
a divergence caused, in large part, by a perceived need
to signal international friends and foes of the credibi
lity of the American commitment to its allies.

Another

factor that might induce a divergence between internal
and external justifications is the need to maintain
ideological consistency.

A number of specialists on

Soviet foreign policy have indicated a divergence exists
between the external rhetoric involving "socialist bro-

2While the arcane language and rationale of
Johnson's advisors was noted, a better example of an
issue area where all but specialists are excluded from
the policy debate is that of strategic nuclear doctrine.
Intricate deterrence theories are not accessible to a
large audience. For more detail on the exclusive lan
guage of nuclear deterrence see Carol Cohn, "Nuclear
Language and How we Learned to Pat the Bomb," Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists (June 1988), 17-24; and Michael Tier
ney, "The Language of Deterrence," The College of William
and Mary, 1986
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therhood" and "commitment to world revolution" and the
extremely pragmatic policies practiced by the Soviets.2
The types of divergence spelled out in the preceding
pages were of two types.

The simple divergence, repre

sented by the Greek-Turkish aid policy, had internal and
external justifications with different arguments con
tained in each.

The qualitative divergence or divergence

of order, which appeared during the debate over the
American role in Vietnam, allowed for similar material in
the two realms but the presentation of the material was
such that a divergence did exist.

It is difficult to

compare the two types of divergence in a quantitative or
graphical sense, but one suspects that the gap between
internal and external justifications would probably be
greater in the case of a simple divergence.
While the internal-external model employs an artifi
cial taxonomy which often simplifies aspects of the
decision-making process, its categories are nevertheless

2Soviet policy in China in 1927, Spain in the late
1930's, and the ultimate abandonment of ideology in 1939
represented by the Soviet pact with fascist Germany
indicate a divergence probably existed. However, since
very few people are privy to the justifications offered
in the Kremlin, the' internal-external scheme is probably
not well suited to examine these questions. American
Cold War rhetoric might offer good opportunities for an
examination of the role of ideology as a cause of diver
gence .
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useful as analytical tools.

This framework offers sever

al benefits to the observer of foreign policy decision
making and international relations.

First, it offers a

system of classificatory terms with which one can uni
formly define numerous events and cases over a broad
range of issue areas.

It is a theoretical coat rack.

Second, the distinction between the two realms encourage
the author and the reader to search for the "real rea
sons" for a given policy.

It also alerts the attentive

observer that neither the internal nor the external
justification is necessarily the "real reason."

Third,

after uncovering a number of internal justifications for
particular policies, one is struck by the nature of power
as understood by policy makers.

The policy makers may be

wrong about their subtle definitions of power, but to
determine this one would have to do significantly more
research.

The internal-external model provides a good

foundation for approaching the question of whether such
"psychological" elements of power are indeed as signifi
cant as the participants in the Vietnam case would indi
cate.3

3It may be the case that Johnson and his advisors
were correct in their assumption that other countries
were concerned with the U.S. reaction to a challenge in
Vietnam.
However, this does not necessarily mean the
administration acted correctly. Even if reputation and
perceptions are an important variable in the power equa-
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While this study has concentrated on divergence between
internal and external justifications, it is entirely
possible for a convergence to exist.

However, the evi

dence of divergence in a large number of policy decisions
examined prior to the writing of this thesis was strik
ing.

Evidence of divergence existed not only in the case

studies provided here but in the Berlin crises, the Cuban
missile crisis, and the Iran-contra affair.
The theoretical skeleton provided here is a prere
quisite to more significant conclusions about the results
of a divergence or a convergence for the success, coher
ence, or acceptability of a policy.

What follows from

the fact that a divergence exists?

Crystal clear cor

relations should not be expected; if they existed, some
one would have noticed by now.

However, if general

conclusions could be contextualized without getting too
specific or descriptive, they could be helpful to policy
makers and political leaders as well as aspiring academi
cians .

tion, the administration could have (and most would agree
it did) miscalculated.
It is hard to believe the U.S.
would have suffered more in the long-run by pulling out
of Vietnam in 1965 despite the damage to its reputation
as a global power and a good ally.

GREEK-TURKISH AID POLICY
Internal Justification
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External Justication

Audience: Professional
bureaucracy, White House
Staff, N.S.C., Selected
diplomats

Audience: Congress,
American public

American interests are
served through world
order, spheres of
influence, and expanding
world trade.

America stands for freedom
of choice and against
aggressive forces in the
world. America is a moral
leader.

The U.S. should commit
funds and support to
Greece and Turkey because:

The U.S. should commit
funds and support to
Greece and Turkey because:

The loss of Greece and
Turkey by default might
encourage the political
neutralization of Western
Europe and political
instability throughout the
world.

There is an imminent
communist military threat
to Western Europe (as well
as Greece and Turkey).

A failure to commit is a
green light to similar
revolutionary movements
elsewhere.
A failure to commit
might, in an indirect way,
lead to the economic
collapse of Western
Europe .
The program will be a
forerunner to a wider aid
program covering all of
Western Europe.

It is the moral
obligation of the United
States to support
democratic forces in
Greece and Turkey (and
elsewhere in the world if
need be) against internal
and external aggression.
There is an ongoing
global struggle between
the forces of good and
evil. This policy puts
the United States on the
moral high ground.

Principal Cause of Divergence--> Congressional/domestic
reluctance to support foreign aid programs.
^Secondary Cause of Divergence— > Signal to the Soviet
Union that the U.S. ,was getting tough. Signal to
democratic forces in western Europe that the U.S. would
help them in reconstruction efforts.
Appendix

A
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VIETNAM INTERVENTION POLICY
Internal Justification

External Justification

Audience: N.S.C., former
policy makers, selected
Congressional leaders

Audience:American allies
throughout the world, So
viet Union, China, nation
alist movements in the
third world, American Pub
lic

Belief among policy makers
that an attentive interna
tional audience viewed the
American response in Viet
nam as a test case for fu
ture security crises.

The United States should
support those forces in
the world fighting for
freedom. American stead
fastness in this case will
serve that goal in the fu
ture .

Reasons U.S. should commit
ground combat forces to
Vietnam (listed in order
of importance):

Reasons U.S. should commit
ground combat forces to
Vietnam (listed in order
of importance):

1. To maintain American
credibility as a nation
which keeps its promises.

1. To aid the people of
South Vietnam who are val
iantly struggling to es
tablish democratic in
stitutions in the face of
aggression from the com
munist north.

2. To maintain the inde
pendence of Vietnam.
While South Vietnam in it
self had little strategic
or economic value for the
U.S., South East Asia was
of considerable import
ance .
3. To improve the freedom
and maintain the integrity
of the people of South
Vietnam who have little
tradition of democracy but
nevertheless must want it.

2. To maintain the in
dependence of the Republic
of Vietnam, which is the
"keystone" in the dike
containing communism in
South East Asia.
3. To maintain
credibility.

^Principal Cause of Divergence of Order:— >The importance
of credibility and power politics in the internal realm
was "unsavory," and certainly nothing one could wave the
flag about.
Appendix B
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